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Abstract 
Every day decision-making can be affected by a number of judgment biases. One such bias 
is known as the sunk cost effect. This occurs when a person or a company invests time, effort, or 
money into something just because they have previously invested in it (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; 
Thaler, 1980). The past 30 years has yielded ample evidence establishing the effect with 
hypothetical scenarios (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Arkes & Ayton, 1999). However, only a fraction of 
the published literature has documented the bias behaviourally and of these, the majority involve 
variations of an operant conditioning paradigm that is largely free of context. The aim of this thesis 
was therefore to seek evidence for a sunk cost effect using short-term behavioural tasks. To that 
end, Chapter 1 highlights the literature surrounding the effect so far and provides context for the 
research discussed in this thesis. 
In Chapter 2, I discuss a series of studies that attempted to find a sunk cost effect in adults 
using various methods. The first two studies utilized behavioural tasks that required a short-term 
investment of time and effort. Both studies failed to find the effect, with the first study revealing the 
reverse – participants were more likely to opt out of doing the tasks when they had already invested 
into it. The aim of the third study was to observe whether an effect could be found when the tasks 
from the first study were presented hypothetically. The rationale here was that there might be 
something about the hypothetical nature of the decision scenario that led people to show sunk cost 
behaviour in previously published work. The results for the third study found neither an effect nor 
the reverse effect found in the behavioural versions. Finally, to ensure that the previously found 
effect in the literature was still relevant, a fourth study was conducted using a scenario from the 
original psychological paper on the sunk cost effect (Arkes & Blumer, 1985). The results replicated 
the sunk cost effect with more participants than the original and using an online sample. 
Chapter 3 was a final attempt to find an effect using a combination of the methods and 
rewards used in the previous chapter. An online sample of participants was presented with a 
computerised variation of a task used in the first study of Chapter 2. Participants also completed a 
risk tolerance assessment to see if their behaviour was related to their tolerance towards risk-taking 
and therefore provide a possible explanation for their tendency to continue or opt out of short-term 
tasks. The risk tolerance survey found no relationship to behaviour on the tasks and this study also 
failed to find a sunk cost effect. 
In Chapter 4 I present a discussion of the possible explanations for the pattern of results 
observed. Despite using different types of tasks, investments, and rewards, a sunk cost effect was 
not found in any of the behavioural tasks developed. Possible reasons for this include that the tasks 
were simply not suitable for finding an effect in the short-term or that the laboratory environment is 
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not always suitable for finding this effect, given other factors (such as tiredness, motivation, and 
desire to participate) that can affect decision-making. There is a gap in our understanding of how 
this bias operates across many of the contexts that people actually face in their everyday lives. 
There is even less understanding of how and why this bias develops – a topic that prompted my 
interest in this thesis to begin with. I finish this chapter with a discussion of future research and 
conclusions for the studies presented here. 
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1.1. General Introduction 
A number of years ago, I was living with a girlfriend and our relationship was rapidly 
deteriorating. We had been together for about 2 years and, in that time, had moved out of our 
respective parents’ houses to a new city with new jobs and only a handful of friends. The issues 
slowly built up over time and despite being aware that the relationship was not likely to work out 
and get better, I persisted in the hope that it would and after all, we had invested so much time and 
effort. As Nisbett (2015) suggested in his book Mindware, if time and effort had value previously 
then it might in the future as well. 
The above represents reasoning that people have used to justify a number of decisions about 
how they invest their resources into various aspects of their life. However, from a rational economic 
point of view, our prior investment of resources into anything should not matter when we consider 
whether to continue to invest in something. Our prior expenditures of time, effort, and money are 
irretrievable and therefore only the future benefits and costs of investing should be considered. In 
other words, rather than focussing on how much time and effort I had spent on my relationship, I 
should have focused on what I was likely going to get out of continuing to be with that person. My 
failure to do this, and the reasoning behind why I did not, is an error of decision-making known as 
the sunk cost effect (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Thaler, 1980).  
Although sunk costs have been a feature of economic theory for decades, it is only in the 
last 30 years that researchers have examined their effect on decision-making as a source of bias 
(Arkes & Ayton, 1999; Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Thaler, 1980). The effect occurs whenever a person 
decides to continue investing time, effort or money into something because they have previously 
invested these resources into it. As stated earlier, rational individuals (in the classical economic 
sense) should ignore these prior costs, as they are typically irretrievable. Instead, only the future 
costs and benefits of continuing to invest should be taken into account.  
Arkes and Blumer (1985) conducted a series of studies to explore the sunk cost effect from a 
psychological perspective. One study involved instructing a group of participants to make decisions 
based on hypothetical vignettes. One such example involved participants having to imagine that 
they were the president of a company, tasked with building a new type of airplane that could not be 
detected by radar.  
In essence, participants are asked to put themselves in a situation where some form of 
monetary investment has been made - although not explicitly stated - over a period of time. In one 
version, a large amount of money has been spent on the radar-blank plane project while in another 
version, no money has been invested (but the amount of available money to finish the project is the 
same). The decision in either case is whether participants are willing to invest the 
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remaining/available money into the radar-blank plane. In both examples, participants are told that 
their investment is not likely to yield a profitable outcome (another company has already made the 
same plane and can market it for a cheaper price) and therefore if they are acting rationally, they 
should not indicate a willingness to continue. This is true regardless of how much money has been 
spent thus far. While there may be sound reasons for continuing to invest in something, people 
should not do so more when sunk costs are higher. In contrast, Arkes and Blumer (1985) showed 
that people do indicate a greater willingness to continue to build the plane when sunk costs are 
present or high.  
1.2. Across contexts 
The foremost examples of the sunk cost effect, like the hypothetical scenarios presented by 
Arkes and Blumer (1985), come from the realm of business (Staw, 1976). Before the bias was 
conceptualised psychologically, a number of studies demonstrated that people would hypothetically 
escalate commitment to failing endeavours in the presence of sunk costs. In one study, Staw (1976) 
presented commerce and business undergraduates with a scenario where they were told to imagine 
themselves as the Financial Vice President of a technology company that has invested a large 
amount of funds into research and development (R&D). Information about the company included 
financial detail and the situation that the company’s profitability has been in decline, with 
participants having to indicate which of two divisions they will allocate $10 million dollars to. In 
the second part of the scenario, five years have passed and information about the financial situation 
is again provided for the company. Participants now have $20 million dollars to allocate but, in this 
part, they can divide the funds between the two divisions however they wish. In all cases the goal is 
to maximise the future earnings of the hypothetical company. Staw found that participants were 
more likely to allocate additional funds when their previous investment had negative consequences. 
There was an even bigger effect of the prior investment when their responsibility for the decision 
was manipulated to be high.  
From these initial studies, the sunk cost effect has been observed across a range of diverse 
contexts. Braverman and Blumenthal-Barby (2012) found that while most medical practitioners 
were not susceptible to the effect, a small percentage indicated a willingness to continue a current 
medical treatment because of a previous investment into it. This was despite being told that the 
likelihood of the treatment being successful was small. Staw and Hoang (1995) showed that 
National Basketball Association (NBA) players that were selected higher in the draft – and paid 
higher – were less likely to be traded to another team, irrespective of their performance. More 
recent evidence suggests that the effect may also exist with National Football League (NFL) teams 
(Keefer, 2017).  
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The sunk cost effect may also not be limited to large investments of money. One 
hypothetical scenario presented to participants by Arkes and Blumer (1985) involved the choice 
between two weekend ski trips to Wisconsin and Michigan (the former $50 and the latter $100). 
Participants are told to imagine that both ski trips turn out to be on the same weekend and that they 
cannot sell or get a refund for either ticket. When asked which ski trip they would go on, despite the 
scenario specifying that the Wisconsin (cheaper) trip is the preferred one, half of the participants 
choose the more expensive Michigan trip. This finding is in line with other research showing a sunk 
cost effect for travel (Park & Jang, 2014). 
The anecdote at the beginning of this thesis may not be isolated or without basis. Dating and 
committed relationships are another context where the sunk cost effect has been found to operate 
(Coleman, 2009; Goodfriend & Agnew, 2008; Rego, Arantes, & Magalhães, 2016). In two 
experiments, Rego et al. (2016) presented large samples of people with hypothetical scenarios about 
an unhappy relationship where the amount of time, money, and effort invested were manipulated. 
For their first experiment, the decision was to simply continue or finish the relationship. For the 
second, participants could choose how much additional time they would be willing to invest in the 
relationship on a scale from 0 to 100 (from “no time” to “a lot of time”). Although there was an 
effect of money and effort in the first experiment, there was no effect of time when the decision was 
dichotomous (continue or finish the relationship). In the second experiment however, a sunk cost 
effect for time was found; with participants willing to invest more (choosing the amount of time on 
a scale) when more time was previously invested. 
There are some contexts for which the effect does not always operate. For example, a field 
study by Ashraf, Berry, and Shapiro (2010) found that higher pricing for a water purification 
solution did not lead to higher use in those that adopted it. It has also been suggested that 
“expertise” may guard against the bias, however this may be limited to domains in which the 
decision maker is an expert and may not preclude susceptibility to other judgment and decision-
making biases. For example, in the case of petroleum exploration, it was found that experts were 
not susceptible to the sunk cost effect when the context was petroleum exploration (Garland & 
Sandefur, 1990). Similarly, expert domain specificity in the sunk cost effect has been found for 
accountants who don’t commit sunk cost errors when making accounting decisions (Tan & Yates, 
1995) but do when it comes to non-accounting contexts. This result was also found for medical 
students when considering non-medical versus medical decisions (Bornstein, Emler, & Chapman, 
1999). Despite these instances, the sunk cost effect can be demonstrated across a number of 
contexts where expertise is likely to be non-existent for most people.  
Cross-cultural data. The majority of research described in this literature review has 
occurred in Western cultural contexts such as the USA. Although it is unlikely that a decision-
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making bias such as the sunk cost effect is limited to Western cultures, it would be inappropriate to 
make strong conclusions about its occurrence or have a complete understanding without observing 
it across multiple, contrasting circumstances and environments. In the broader literature on 
decision-making, there is evidence to suggest that there are cultural differences in how people 
approach risk (Weber & Hsee, 1998) but research explicitly testing differences between cultures on 
the sunk cost effect is sparse. 
One study by Pattaratanakun and Mak (2015) observed the effect using experiments where 
participants from Thailand and Britain had to choose between a number of hypothetical products 
with various costs and benefits. The basic task was to visit virtual shops where a product could be 
purchased for a certain number of tokens (randomly assigned around a normal distribution of cost 
where the mean was 430 tokens and the standard deviation was 50). In addition to the cost of the 
product, tokens were “charged” for each time that participants had the opportunity to buy a product 
or continue searching in other stores for one. Therefore, costs are incurred by continuing to search 
while also not picking the most optimal product for each game/trial. The aggregate cost of 
searching (as well as the final cost/benefit when purchase was made) was always available to see. 
The findings from their experiments showed that while participants were susceptible to sunk costs, 
Thai participants tended to over search when search costs were high while the UK participants 
under searched when costs were low. In a final experiment, making the sunk costs non-salient 
eliminated this cultural difference. 
One explanation for why this cultural difference may have been found has to do with the 
collectivist versus individualist context of Thai and British cultures. In one of the studies, 
Pattaratanakun and Mak (2015) presented bicultural Thai participants (English and Thai) with 
Western and Eastern versions of the scenarios. In this instance, the bicultural participants showed a 
pattern of results consistent with those found in their other experiments: over searching when costs 
were high while under searching for low costs. In other words, the cultural context of the scenario 
influenced the effect of search-sunk costs. The authors’ explanation for these results is that in 
collectivist cultures, it might be customary for families to share the costs and burden of any 
individual of that family when they are investing in something and it is not working. Alternatively, 
individualistic or Western cultures may place more responsibility on the individual making the 
decision. This idea has some support, with sunk cost effect research suggesting that having a higher 
personal responsibility for an investment can increase the likelihood of that person escalating 
commitment to a failing project (Garland, 1990; Staw, 1976).  
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1.3. Explanations for the sunk cost effect  
There are numerous explanations for why a bias such as the sunk cost effect might occur. 
Among these, prospect theory offers a plausible reason for why people may be susceptible to a 
previous investment of resources (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Thaler, 1980). Prospect Theory predicts 
that people treat losses and gains differently such that losses have a higher degree of lost utility than 
the degree to which a person gets utility from gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). This generally 
results in people becoming risk seeking when faced with the prospect of a sure loss and risk averse 
when presented with a sure gain. In a sunk cost situation, when a person invests into a project and it 
becomes evident that a decision needs to be made to stop or continue, they must weigh up the costs 
and benefits (or gains and losses) of each option. If a large amount of resources has been invested 
into a project, the decision to abandon the project constitutes a sure loss of those previously 
invested resources. Since people are averse to losses (particularly sure losses) they are likely to 
continue investing as a gamble for a positive outcome. In addition, since a person is potentially at a 
net loss with their invested resources, they stand to gain a lot if their investment pays off (even 
though this is unlikely). 
In their seminal paper on the sunk cost effect, Arkes and Blumer (1985), building on 
Prospect Theory explain the phenomenon by appealing to the idea that humans have a propensity to 
avoid waste. They argue that people generally have an aversion to wasting their time, effort, or 
money and to decide not to continue spending these resources on something constitutes an 
admission of wasting those resources already invested (Arkes, 1996; Larrick, Morgan, & Nisbett, 
1990). In one study, Arkes (1996) found that people were more likely to correctly discontinue a 
failing investment when they had the option to sell their invested material to someone else (where 
the implication is that the materials will get used for another purpose) versus selling the material for 
its “scrap value.” In other words, participants are less susceptible to the sunk cost effect when they 
do not have to waste their prior investment.  
Another explanation provided by Arkes and Blumer (1985) for the sunk cost effect is that 
people need to feel justified by their previous decision to start investing in a project in the first 
place. Like the process of cognitive dissonance, people can justify their prior actions to continue 
investing because in their minds they must have had a good reason for investing time, effort, and 
money into something and want to rationalise this prior investment (Festinger, 1957; Staw, 1976). 
As Arkes and Blumer point out, however, this explanation can account for people re-evaluating 
their prior investments in a positive manner when someone is sitting through a bad movie (or 
perhaps a bad relationship) but it is unlikely that this also holds for the person or company spending 
large sums of money. 
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The most recent theory for why the effect occurs was proposed by Magalhães and White 
(2016) whose aim was to account for findings across human and non-human animal research by 
proposing a more unified theory of sunk cost effect behaviour. They proposed a contrast effect, 
where the option or choice associated with an investment is preferred to an alternative where no 
investment has been made and its value unclear. The reason for the preference of this option would 
not be dissimilar to the other explanations for continuing to invest, such as waste avoidance. 
Critically, however, when the value of the investment option has decreased (due to the passage of 
time for example) then the contrast is less severe, and alternative options become more attractive. In 
these instances, and unlike other explanations such as Prospect Theory, waste avoidance, and self-
justification, the contrast effect can account for prevailing findings where the effect is reduced or 
reversed. The theory can also account for the research that finds a sunk cost effect in non-human 
animals where it is difficult or inappropriate to assess psychological constructs such as waste 
avoidance and self-justification (Magalhães & White, 2016). 
1.4. Behavioural sunk costs 
One of the rationales for the studies described in this thesis was to find further evidence of 
the sunk cost effect for actual investments of time and effort. The majority of psychology research 
on the sunk cost effect (and indeed, many of the biases described in the psychological, decision-
making literature) has used hypothetical scenarios as the method of revealing a bias. Up until this 
point, the examples of the sunk cost effect for actual behaviour include NBA playing time (Staw & 
Hoang, 1995) and anecdotes such as the one described by Arkes and Blumer (1985) about a 
politician’s admission to not wanting to waste taxpayer money on a large scale dam project. It is 
evident that susceptibility to this bias can produce less than positive outcomes and therefore it is 
important to find more behavioural contexts for understanding its applicability and relevance. To 
that end, this section will outline some of the evidence for the effect for actual investments of time, 
effort, and money.  
In addition to some of the examples provided above, the broader economics literature has 
examples of the sunk cost effect in everyday life. In a study by Ho, Png, and Reza (2017) a sunk 
cost effect was observed in the Singaporean car market, where paying a higher price for a car led to, 
at least initially, where higher prices may lead to initially more driving. Englmaier and Schmöller 
(2010) found the effect in an online, football managing game where virtual players are traded. 
Large firms may be susceptible in the domain of research and development (Máñez, Rochina-
Barrachina, Sanchis, & Sanchis, 2009). Finally, it is possible that the effect can explain how much 
all-you-can-eat-pizza a person consumes, dependent on whether or not a discount has been offered 
(Just & Wansink, 2011). 
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Arkes and Blumer (1985) provide one of the earliest examples of the sunk cost effect using 
a naturalistic behavioural experiment. Potential patrons at a large university were sold season 
tickets to the theatre at different, randomly assigned prices. People either bought the tickets at a 
small discounted price ($13), large discounted price ($8), or the normal price ($15). By tracking 
theatre attendance, Arkes and Blumer were able to identify if patrons attended plays because of the 
different prices they had paid for the tickets. Indeed patrons attended more plays the more they had 
paid for tickets. Interestingly, the effect did not influence patrons who payed more to attend more 
plays for the second half of the season, suggesting that there is a time limit to the influence of sunk 
costs. A similar finding was found for gymnasium attendance (Gourville & Soman, 1998) and the 
Singaporean car market paper (Ho et al., 2017). Further research by Soman (2001) highlights the 
potential depreciation of the effect when he found that unless a monetary amount was attached to a 
previous investment, the effect of time could reduce or eliminate the sunk cost effect.  
In another study participants were brought into a lab and presented with a large puzzle that 
could not (practically) be completed within the timeframe of the experiment (Navarro & Fantino, 
2009). The reward for completing the puzzle was leaving the experiment early and the invested 
“resources” in this case were time and effort. After a pre-determined amount of time, participants 
were given the opportunity to opt out. If participants chose to opt out then they would be given 
questionnaires to complete but could not leave until a few minutes before the scheduled duration of 
the experiment. Alternatively, participants could choose to gamble (roll of two dice) for the 
possibility of leaving the experiment immediately. In every instance, the gamble was marginally 
unfavourable for the participant. If participants chose to gamble and lost, they would continue 
completing the puzzle until another predetermined amount of time had passed. At this point, the 
opportunity to opt out or gamble for an early finish was repeated again. Since the questionnaires 
were arguably less effortful and participants would still be able to leave a little earlier, the rational 
option is to opt out. The authors were interested to see if participants would be more likely to 
gamble the second time they had the opportunity to opt out (provided they gambled and lost the first 
time). This is exactly what happened, highlighting the influence of sunk effort and time into the 
task. This study provides some evidence of a sunk cost effect using behavioural tasks however it is 
unclear if the decision to continue is irrational in this study because it is possible that completing a 
puzzle is more enjoyable (even if you cannot complete it) than completing questionnaires for the 
remaining time of the experiment. 
Another study using behavioural measures was conducted by Cunha Jr and Caldieraro 
(2009). In one experiment, participants were presented with a task where they had to rate attributes 
of hypothetical generic, electronic gadgets. Participants were told that all of the attributes were 
equally important and that the goal was to find the gadget with the highest overall rating. For half of 
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the particpants, the ratings were given as fractions which needed to be simplified before calculating 
the total ratings for each gadget. The other half were presented with whole number ratings. Once 
ratings were calculated they could then select the gadget with the highest rating. Upon selection, the 
participants were then presented with a hypothetical situation where they discovered that another 
product has just become available and they could switch to choosing it. The new product either had 
a slightly better rating or a much better rating. The dependent variable of interest was participant’s 
willingness (rated on a scale from 1 to 7) to switch to the new product. In this instance, a sunk cost 
effect is represented by the additional effort (and time) of having to simplify the fraction-ratings.  
Regardless of the effort/time spent on the task, participants should be equally willing to switch to 
the new product. In accordance with previous research, Cunha Jr and Caldieraro (2009) found that 
when the opportunity cost of switching to the new product was small, participants who expended 
more effort in the ratings were less likely to switch. A second experiment by the authors with a 
similar method (e.g. pens instead of gadgets) further supported these results. Although the afore-
introduced studies represent a narrow range of behavioural research, it provides some evidence of 
an effect when time and effort are involved. 
Conditioning and non-human animals. There is a growing body of research into the sunk 
cost effect with animals. Using an operant conditioning paradigm, these studies are able to observe 
the sunk cost effect at its most basic level: do agents (in this case, non-human animals) preference 
an option because they have previously invested in it (in this instance, a simple physical response)? 
Whereas traditional sunk cost scenarios have a specific context, such as the radar blank plane 
scenario, with numerous factors involved, this approach strips out the context to observe the basic 
sunk cost situation of preferencing an option because of previous responding to that option. 
The basic setup of these experiments is to present a non-human animal such as a rat or 
pigeon, with a key pressing task where food is obtainable. As an example Navarro and Fantino 
(2005) presented pigeons with two keys where one produces food on a fixed ratio (FR) schedule 
and the other terminates the current trial, starting a new one with a new FR schedule. In addition, 
the required number of key presses for food can randomly change from trial to trial, with a lower 
work requirement having a higher probability of occurring on any given trial. The optimal strategy 
for subjects is to only press the key until they have completed the response requirement for the 
smallest FR ratio, otherwise they should press the escape key and start a new trial. Persistence past 
the minimum (and most probable) FR schedule is non-optimal, and therefore considered a sunk cost 
effect. Across a number of experiments, Navarro and Fantino found that pigeons were able to 
behave optimally (by escaping a trial) when a signal was provided to cue a change in the FR 
schedule. Therefore in absence of a signal change, the pigeons would behave non-optimally (a sunk 
cost-like effect). A similar finding was obtained with human participants. Although the factors that 
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influence whether humans commit the sunk cost effect are likely to be different to non-human 
animals, the Navarro and Fantino study represents a possible way of revealing a sunk cost effect.  
A sunk cost-like effect has since been shown in pigeons (Avila-Santibañez, Gonzalez-
Montiel, Miranda-Hernandez, & de Lourdes Guzman-Gonzalez, 2010; Fujimaki & Sakagami, 2016; 
Macaskill & Hackenberg, 2012; Magalhaes & White, 2014a, 2014c; Magalhães & White, 2014b; 
Navarro & Fantino, 2005; Pattison, Zentall, & Watanabe, 2012), rats (Magalhães, White, Stewart, 
Beeby, & Van Der Vliet, 2012), and humans (Avila, Yankelevitz, Gonzalez, & Hackenberg, 2013; 
Navarro & Fantino, 2005), using variations of the afore-detailed conditioning paradigm. In a study 
by Pattison et al. (2012), pigeons were presented with two coloured keys where the response 
requirement was 15 and up to 30 presses respectively. At the start of a trial, a third key was lit up 
with a colour corresponding to the colour of the up to 30-response key and the subject had to press 
for a pre-determined number of responses. Once the response requirement of the third key was met, 
the other two keys would light up and the animal could now respond on either one. If the subject 
chose the button with a response requirement up to 30, the amount of actual responses required was 
the difference between 30 and the amount of responses from the initial, third key. This meant that 
on some trials, the animal may respond at a higher rate than is necessary to achieve a reward (e.g. if 
5 responses on the initial key were required, then the subsequent choice would be either the 15-
response key or 25-response key). The rational option is for the animal to choose one of the two 
keys that require the minimal amount of responses to get a reward. In line with a sunk cost effect, 
the authors found that pigeons preferred the up to 30-response key, even when this involved a 
higher work requirement. Subsequent research has supported this finding using further variations of 
the conditioning paradigm (Magalhaes & White, 2014a; Magalhães & White, 2016). 
To recap, the investment in sunk cost studies is physical effort with a food reward for their 
responses. It is useful to highlight this research as it provides evidence that the sunk cost effect is 
not confined to convoluted scenarios that require a specific set of variables to occur but can also be 
found for simple behavioural tasks with a constrained context (response/food). To the extent that 
these studies represent good evidence of the sunk cost effect in animals, and animals which are 
phylogenetically distant from one another, then we can conclude that it is likely a bias that is 
widespread across much of the animal kingdom. But there is a large gap in our knowledge of where 
this bias operates. The evidence described here ranges from multiple short-term behavioural 
investments that are relatively free of context to one-off decisions about small and large 
investments made in the hypothetical realm. To be confident that this is a bias that actually affects 
behaviour, it is important to demonstrate that individuals make non-optimal decisions that include 
both context and actual behaviour with real investments. Addressing this gap was part of the 
motivation for this thesis. Before explaining the rationale in full, the next section will detail 
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evidence of the sunk cost effect in children to provide context for the series of studies that were 
conducted here. 
1.5. Across the lifespan  
In addition to finding further evidence that people are susceptible to the sunk cost effect 
when they invest actual time, effort, and money, another motivation for this thesis was to explore 
the sunk cost effect in young children. To fully understand how and why biases such as the sunk 
cost are developed and maintained, it is important to look across the lifespan. In a summary of 
evidence, Arkes and Ayton (1999) posited that children may be less susceptible to the sunk cost 
effect than adults. There is evidence that older adults may be less susceptible to the effect than 
younger adults (Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff, 2012; Bruine de Bruin, Strough, & Parker, 
2014; Strough et al., 2016; Strough, Schlosnagle, & Didonato, 2011). However, the opposite was 
found for the context of committed relationships in the study by Rego et al. (2016). If you provide 
context with a hypothetical scenario where people are told that they do not have long to live, they 
are less susceptible to the effect. An explanation for this, and one for why older adults might be less 
susceptible in some contexts is that prior investments are less important when considering the future 
as an older adult (Strough, Schlosnagle, Karns, Lemaster, & Pichayayothin, 2014). That the 
existence of this bias is non-linear across the lifespan is not unique to the sunk cost effect but occurs 
for other biases such as hindsight (Bernstein, Erdfelder, Meltzoff, Peria, & Loftus, 2011). Again, if 
we want to have a sound understanding of how biases such as the sunk cost effect develop then it is 
important to examine the contexts and ages at which it occurs. 
Thus far, the majority of the research on the effect has been conducted with adults while 
there are limited studies in children (Baron, Granato, Spranca, & Teubal, 1993; Klaczynski & 
Cottrell, 2004; Morsanyi & Handley, 2008). One of the exceptions that was published after the 
Arkes and Ayton (1999) paper was conducted by Klaczynski and Cottrell (2004). These authors 
tested 8 to 14 year-olds on a number of hypothetical scenarios that were appropriate for young 
children. Like those used with adults, the scenarios often depicted a short-term investment of time, 
effort and/or money and children had to decide between two alternatives: one that indicates a 
susceptibility to sunk costs, and one that was the optimal choice. Non-sunk cost scenarios were also 
presented to ensure that the scenarios were not misunderstood and children were capable of making 
the optimal choice. Not only was a sunk cost effect found but older children were less likely to be 
susceptible than younger children.  
The age-related difference in sunk cost susceptibility is somewhat mixed. Another study by 
Morsanyi and Handley (2008) presented hypothetical scenarios to children aged 5 to 11 years to 
assess four types of reasoning and decision-making. Two tasks, similar to those used by Klaczynski 
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and Cottrell (2004), assessed children’s susceptibility to the sunk cost effect. The authors found that 
young children were susceptible to the effect but that this did not change across age groups. These 
findings support an earlier study by Baron et al. (1993) using hypothetical vignettes which also 
found a sunk cost effect with young children that did not differ according to age. Other studies have 
found different results again, where young children may be less susceptible than older children 
(Krouse, 1986; Webley & Plaisier, 1998). Crucially, none of the studies cited here used short-term 
behavioural investments or tasks. As with the majority of the research in adults, hypothetical 
scenarios were used, representing a short-term investment of money by an individual. From the 
studies cited it is unclear how the effect is developed or the contexts where it occurs. 
1.6. Rationale 
The original goal of this thesis was to better understand how the sunk cost effect develops 
by observing its occurrence (or not) in young children. I wanted to use methods that involved actual 
investments of time, effort, and/or money in a short-term behavioural context due to the lack of 
clarity in how this effect manifests in everyday life. In their study, Webley and Plaisier (1998) 
identified the difficulty in using hypothetical scenarios with young children because of the potential 
to misunderstand the scenarios and context being presented. The conditioning experiments 
highlighted previously show that complex contextual information can be stripped back to observe 
the basic sunk cost effect, however it is also possible that some context is required to observe 
whether the effect is meaningful in a sense that matters to daily life. The studies described here 
were an attempt to find tasks that balanced these considerations and could later be adapted for use 
with children. 
While the behavioural studies described by Arkes and Blumer (1985),  Navarro and Fantino 
(2009), and Cunha Jr and Caldieraro (2009) provide sound evidence for the sunk cost effect, their 
tasks and measures may not be suitable for young children (e.g. calculating fractions or lengthy 
behavioural effort). As a first step, I wanted to find further evidence of the sunk cost effect in 
adults, to ensure that there was validity to any novel tasks that were devised and used. It would have 
been difficult to make conclusions about whether children’s behaviour were due to a sunk cost bias 
if those same, or similar, tasks did not find an effect in adults when the available evidence in adults 
suggests that they are susceptible (albeit, largely hypothetically and anecdotally).  
To this end, Chapter 2 describes the initial attempts to find a sunk cost effect in adults using 
behavioural and hypothetical tasks. This chapter also includes a replication of one of the original 
scenarios described by Arkes and Blumer (1985). Since the studies described in Chapter 2 were 
written up as one large manuscript for publication, there is one introduction at the beginning to 
provide context and background information for all the subsequent studies. Although the studies 
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contained in Chapter 2 could have been split into two or more separate chapters there would have 
been needless repetition in the background theory and research. In lieu of individual introductions 
for each study, a summary and interim discussion is provided for each study in addition to a general 
discussion for the chapter. Chapter 3 was a final, separate attempt to find a sunk cost effect in adults 
using a computer-based investment task and includes its own introduction and study discussion. 
Chapter 4 is a general discussion of the thesis findings with strengths, limitations, and suggestions 
for future research in the area of the sunk cost effect.  
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Chapter 2 – Exploring the sunk cost effect in adults using behavioural tasks with 
follow-up studies 
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Abstract 
A cognitive bias known as the sunk cost effect has been found across a number of contexts. This 
bias drives the continued investment of time, effort, or money into an endeavour on the basis of 
prior investments into it. In Studies 1 and 2, we attempted to observe whether this effect occurs for 
short-term behavioural investments using various tasks with different investments and rewards. In 
Study 1, a reverse sunk cost effect was found; with participants more likely to opt out after having 
invested into the tasks. Although the method and tasks were varied as an attempt to account for 
possible explanations of the results of Study 1, no sunk cost effect was found for Study 2. In Study 
3, we attempted to find an effect using hypothetical scenarios that were analagous to the 
behavioural investments presented in Study 1. This also failed to reveal an effect. Finally, Study 4 
was an attempt to replicate a previously used hypothetical investment scenario; with results this 
time revealing the effect as found in the original paper. A number of explanations for this pattern of 
results, such as participation and salient physical exertion, are discussed, with the possibility that 
some forms of short-term behavioural investments are not subject to the sunk cost effect. 
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Study 1 – Exploring the sunk cost effect in adults using behavioural tasks 
2.1. Introduction 
The sunk cost effect is the tendency to invest resources into an endeavour because prior 
resources have already been invested into it - even if better alternatives are available (Arkes & 
Ayton, 1999; Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Arkes & Hutzel, 2000; Conlon & Garland, 1993; Garland, 
1990; Garland & Conlon, 1998; Garland & Newport, 1991; Magalhães & White, 2016; Navarro & 
Fantino, 2005, 2009; Strough et al., 2014; Thaler, 1980). Since prior expenditures cannot be 
retrieved, only future incremental costs and benefits of continuing or discontinuing should be 
considered. A classic example from Arkes and Blumer (1985) highlights this effect. Participants 
were instructed to imagine themselves leading a large airline company that has invested a 
considerable sum of money building a new, radar-blank plane. After having invested the majority of 
allocated funds to the project, it is revealed that another company has already built a similar radar-
blank plane and can sell it for cheaper than the participants’ imagined company. Despite the grim 
future that further investment would entail, and counter to predictions of economic rationality, 
many participants indicated a willingness to invest the remaining funds. In this case, the investment 
is a large sum of money with the potential reward of a new plane that will hopefully yield profits for 
the company. It was theorized that participants continued because they did not want to “waste” the 
resources already invested and hence are committing a sunk cost effect (Arkes, 1996; Arkes & 
Blumer, 1985).  
As described in the beginning of this thesis, there is a large amount of research from the last 
30 years where hypothetical vignettes, like the one above, are used as the method of revealing the 
effect (Arkes, 1996; Garland, 1990; Sofis, Jarmolowicz, Hudnall, & Reed, 2015; Soman, 2001; 
Staw, 1976; Strough et al., 2011). For some decision-making biases, the use of hypothetical rewards 
is not problematic. For example, studies reveal no meaningful differences in decisions involving the 
framing effect for real versus hypothetical payoffs (Kuhberger, Schulte-Mecklenbeck, & Perner, 
2002). In contrast, research using lottery games suggest that participants will choose differently 
when the games are played using hypothetical and real monetary rewards (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 
1992). In cases of the sunk cost effect, we have an incomplete picture of when investments of time 
and effort produce different decision-making. It is therefore important to observe a multitude of 
behavioural situations where these investments are actually made. 
The wider business and economics literature provides some examples of the sunk cost effect 
with real monetary and behavioural investments (Englmaier & Schmöller, 2010; Ho et al., 2017; 
Just & Wansink, 2011; Máñez et al., 2009). There are also a number of examples of the sunk cost 
effect with behavioural investments in non-human animals (Macaskill & Hackenberg, 2012, 2013; 
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Magalhaes & White, 2014c; Magalhães & White, 2014b; Magalhães et al., 2012), however, only a 
handful of non-monetary, short-term behavioural studies exist in humans (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; 
Coleman, 2009; Cunha Jr & Caldieraro, 2009; Navarro & Fantino, 2009). In the general 
introduction, I described a few examples of these behavioural studies including the theatre ticket 
study by Arkes and Blumer (1985); the gadget rating problems by Cunha Jr and Caldieraro (2009); 
and the puzzle experiment conducted by Navarro and Fantino (2009).   
Daily life is full of tasks that are short-term in nature. The afore-introduced research 
highlights that the sunk cost effect can occur for short-term investments of money, time, and mental 
effort. Investment can also take the form of physical effort, yet no prior study has evaluated whether 
a sunk cost effect can be found as an outcome of this. Research using behavioural tasks such as 
those described above is sparse but the results do shed light on the possibility of finding an effect 
for effort. For example, it is possible that investments of effort are similar to those of time. Soman 
(2001) found that time only produces a sunk cost effect when money is also associated with the 
investment. Furthermore, it has been found that the effect of other types of investments can 
decrease as the time between the initial investment and decision increase (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; 
Gourville & Soman, 1998; Staw & Hoang, 1995). In contrast, the study by Navarro and Fantino 
(2009) shows that it is possible to get a sunk cost effect for time when short-term behavioural tasks 
are used. The question of whether this effect can be found for physical effort is therefore open.  
Thus, the aim of Study 1 was to see whether (a) an effect for actual physical effort could be 
found (b) using behavioural tasks. To do this, a balance had to be struck between devising tasks that 
were effortful enough for participants to feel sufficiently invested in, yet not so effortful that they 
would rather stop, regardless of potential rewards. The tasks we used were therefore designed to be 
simple, requiring no specific skill and taking no longer than 10 to 15 minutes each. These factors 
were important because the problem with using tasks such as the puzzle used by Navarro and 
Fantino (2009) is that the amount of variation in puzzle completing ability may be large compared 
to tasks with simple completion methods. In addition, the difficulty of completing a jigsaw puzzle is 
non-linear: the closer a puzzle is to being finished, the easier it should be to complete. For the 
current study, participants either got the choice to get small, but certain cash rewards for opting out 
before completing a task, or to gamble for a larger cash reward by persisting in attempting to finish. 
The amount that participants had to invest to complete the task (none versus most of it) was also 
varied. The probabilities of each gamble was such that the amount that participants could expect to 
win would be equal to or less than taking the smaller cash rewards. This is important, as it would be 
problematic attributing a sunk cost effect if the reward for continuing to invest was likely to be 
higher than for stopping. If participants are susceptible to the sunk cost effect they will continue the 
task in the High Investment conditions at higher rates than in the No Investment conditions. 
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Participants in the higher probability conditions will also continue at higher rates than the 
participants in the lower probability conditions. 
2.1.1. Method 
Participants 
One hundred and twenty-seven participants were recruited from a paid participant pool at a 
large metropolitan university. Seven participants were excluded from analysis due to procedural 
error. As a result, the final sample included 40 males and 80 females with a mean age of 22.5 years 
(SD = 3.58). Although demographic information was not used for analyses in this study, 
participants in the sample were diverse. The highest percentages of participants were born in Brazil 
(26%), Malaysia (17%), and Australia (17%) and the remaining portion spread across 15 other 
countries. English was the most common primary language spoken (35%) however, a large majority 
had other first languages. Participants were paid $10 regardless of the outcome but had the 
opportunity to win an additional $15. 
Design and materials 
A 2 x 2 between-subjects design was employed with Investment (none versus high) as the 
first factor and Probability (low versus high) as the second factor. The main dependent variable of 
interest was the total number of times that participants opted out of completing the tasks. Reasons 
for participants’ decisions on each task were also recorded. 
Three tasks were employed: A Tube task, Card sorting task, and Ring task (See Table 2.1). 
The Tube task required participants to fill up a transparent tube (height = 60cm, diameter = 5cm) 
with wooden beads (2cm) one by one. The Card sorting task involved placing white playing cards 
onto a piece of black cardboard, one at a time. Each card (8.8cm x 6.4cm) had a round coloured 
sticker (4 colours: Red, Yellow, Light Blue, Dark Blue) in the centre with a corresponding coloured 
arrow marker on the cardboard where each card needed to be placed. Finally, the Ring task required 
small rings (1cm) of 5 different colours to be placed onto wooden dowels (9.5cm) that were 
attached to a white, wooden block (32.5cm x 6.5cm x3.5cm). As with the first two tasks, each ring 
had to be taken one at a time but colour did not matter for the purposes of the task.  
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Table 2.1  
Experimental tasks 
Tube Task Card Task Ring Task 
 
Tube 
 
Placement Board 
 
Base With Dowels 
 
Beads 
 
Cards 
 
Rings 
Regardless of condition, the beads, cards, and rings were placed on a chair approximately 2 
metres from where they needed to be taken to complete the task. Although the tasks were designed 
to be effortful, they were not designed to require specific skills. The experimenter recorded 
completion time and decision responses while sitting at a table and chair, adjacent to where 
participants completed the tasks. A single red die was used for determining the reward outcome 
when participants chose to complete, or continue completing, the tasks. Finally, money was used as 
the reward for each task. If a participant chose not to do the task (or discontinue) then the reward 
was $2.50. If they continued, completed, and the result of the dice roll was in their favor (with 
probability of success depending on condition), then the reward was $5. Money was only given at 
the conclusion of the experiment and participants could effectively win a total of between $10 (the 
base amount for participation with a failed gamble occuring on each task) and $25 (the base amount 
for participation with a successful gamble occuring on each task). 
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Procedure 
All data collection took place in a dedicated university test room. Participants completed a 
short demographic questionnaire and were given a briefing of the study. The experimenter then 
informed them that the first task would be brought out. Tasks were kept behind a curtain and 
introduced one at a time (order of presentation counterbalanced across participants). The 
experimenter demonstrated how to do the task and clarified what qualified as completing it. In all 
conditions, participants were told that the task was timed and that they would be periodically 
informed “how they were doing”, although no specific timeframe was given. The basic task 
instructions were the same for every participant, however, phrases were altered depending on 
condition and task. Participants were given the opportunity to clarify, or be re-instructed, on the 
tasks before proceeding if they did not understand what was required. 
No investment. While demonstrating the task, the experimenter explained how to complete 
each. An example explanation for participants completing the Tube task was “In this task, you need 
to fill up the tube with the wooden beads, one at a time, until it’s filled up. Filling up the tube in this 
case is filling it up to the black marker.” The Ring task had similar instructions, with the 
experimenter indicating a black marker that constituted completing the task. Participants were also 
told to fill up each dowel first before moving on to the next dowel. The black markers/completion 
points for both the Tube and Ring tasks represented 25% of the absolute total of the task being 
complete. When the Card task was being demonstrated, participants were told to distribute the cards 
until they were all sorted (25% of the amount that the Investment participants had to sort). To 
summarise, all three tasks required participants to do 25% of each task (25 beads, 25 rings, 25 
cards) before they were considered complete.  
Before starting the task the experimenter proposed the following choice: “You can either 
cash out now and get $2.50 for sure, or you can do the task and if you complete it, I’ll roll a dice. If 
it comes up <dice outcome>, you get nothing but if it comes up <dice outcome>, you get $5.” In the 
High Probability conditions, the probability was manipulated to be a 50/50 chance; with an outcome 
of rolling 1-3 resulting in nothing and 4-6 resulting in $5. In the Low Probability conditions, rolling 
1-5 resulted in nothing whereas 6 resulted in $5. If participants chose not to do the task then it was 
packed away and the next task was brought out. If they chose to continue and complete the task, 
following completion the experimenter restated the dice roll outcomes and assured them that the 
dice was fair. The outcome was recorded, this task was packed away and the next task brought out. 
The order of the choice options and the dice roll outcomes were counterbalanced. 
Investment. The demonstrations and instructions for the tasks in the Investment conditions 
were similar to the No Investment conditions, however, what constituted task completion was 
different. For the Tube and Ring tasks, this was the top of the tube and all of the dowels 
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respectively. For the Card task, participants were once again instructed to sort the cards until they 
were all distributed. Then, instead of getting the choice to continue or cash out upfront, participants 
were told “that at some point during the task” they would be stopped and given the afore- described 
choice. Participants completed 75% of each task (75 beads, 75 rings, 75 cards) before getting the 
choice to cash out or continue. At this point the amount required to complete the tasks was 25% of 
the total (same as the Low Investment conditions) and participants were always told that “time 
wise, they are on track to complete.” From here, the procedure was identical to the No Investment 
conditions.  
If participants chose to cash out, the current task was packed away and the next one 
presented. Alternatively, if the decision to do the task/continue was made, the stopwatch was 
started/continued and participants resumed completing the task. Once completed, they were 
reminded of the outcomes of the dice roll and informed that the die was not biased. Once the die 
was rolled, the task was packed away and the next task brought out. Regardless of condition or 
choice, every participant was asked to give a reason for his or her decision immediately after it was 
made. 
In summary, the main difference between the investment conditions was that rather than 
giving the choice upfront before anything had been invested, in the investment conditions the 
choice was given after participants completed 75% of the task. Therefore, the two investment 
conditions have the same choices, probabilities, rewards and the incremental amount of the task that 
is remaining, but the amount of effort that has previously been expended is different. 
Coding 
A score of 1 was given each time a participant chose to cash out or a 0 if they chose to 
complete the task; giving a total possible score of 3 for persisting to task completion. 
2.1.2. Results 
Preliminary analyses 
A number of tests were conducted to ensure that the effects of any extraneous variables were 
limited. No significant pattern was observed across the three different tasks in the levels of opting 
out or continuing to do the task, χ2 (360) = 1.27, p = .529. There was no correlation between age 
and the frequency with which participants opted out of the task, r (120) = .012, p = .898. There was 
no effect of sex on the level of opting out U = 1514.50, z = -.497, p = .633. A Kruskal-Wallis test 
found no effect of task order, χ2 (5) = .64, p = .986. Finally, participants were no more likely to opt 
out or continue on the first task than the last task, χ2 (240) = .61, p = .436. These variables are not 
considered further.                                                                           
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Main analyses 
To identify whether a sunk cost effect was present, a regression analysis was conducted to 
see if investment and probability predicted participants’ total opting out. The mean totals for opting 
out between the conditions is shown in Figure 2.1.  
 
Figure 2.1. Mean total opting out between the investment and probability conditions: No 
Investment Low = 1.67 (SD = 1.06); No Investment High = 0.60 (SD = 1.04); Investment Low = 
2.23 (SD = 0.77; Investment High = 1.10 (SD = 1.06).  
Results of the overall model found that both investment and probability predicted opting 
out. Compared to participants in the no investment conditions, an investment in the task predicted 
greater opting out. Probability also predicted total opting out behaviour, such that a higher 
probability of winning meant that participants tended to opt out less. A summary of the regression 
anaylsis is shown in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2 
Investment and probability predicting total opting out behaviour. 
     95% CI 
Predictors t p β B (SE) Lower Higher 
Constant 5.73 <.001 N/A 2.25 (0.39) 1.47 3.03 
Investment 2.96 .004 .23 0.53 (0.18) 0.18 0.89 
Probability -6.11 <.001 -.48 -1.10 (0.18) -1.46 -0.74 
Note. Overall model, F(2, 117) = 23.01, p < .001, R2 = .28. 
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Aligned Rank Transform (ART) was performed on the data to identify any interaction 
effects. The ART method was created as a way of analysing data with multiple factors that do not 
meet the assumptions for a parametric test. This method works by “stripping out” all effects except 
for the one of interest (including main effects), then ranking them to allow for a parametric analysis 
of variance (ANOVA) to be conducted (Salter & Fawcett, 1993; Wobbrock, Findlater, Gergle, & 
Higgins, 2011). This failed to find a significant interaction, F(1, 116) = 0.10, p = .75. 
Analysing by task, logistic regression analyses were conducted to determine whether 
investment or probability could predict whether participants would opt out or not for each of the 
three tasks. A summary of these predictions can be found in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3  
Investment and probability predicting opt out behaviour by task. 
0 0 0 0 0 00 95% CI 
Predictor β (SE) Wald df p Odds ratio Lower Higher 
Tube N/A N/A N N N/A N/A N/A 
Constant -0.91 (0.82) 1.24 1 .266 0.40 N/A N/A 
Investment -0.54 (0.40) 1.85 1 .174 0.59 0.27 1.27 
Probability 1.37 (0.40) 11.95 1 .001 3.94 1.81 8.57 
Ring N/A N/A N N N/A N/A N/A 
Constant -0.52 (0.80) 0.42 1 .515 0.59 N/A N/A 
Investment -1.09 (0.41) 7.11 1 .008 0.34 0.15 0.75 
Probability 1.49 (0.41) 13.35 1 <.001 4.43 1.99 9.84 
Card N/A N/A N N N/A N/A N/A 
Constant -1.60 (0.83) 3.71 1 .054 0.20 N/A N/A 
Investment -0.95 (0.43) 4.90 1 .027 0.39 0.17 0.90 
Probability 2.04 (0.43) 22.74 1 <.001 7.70 3.33 17.82 
Note. Hosmer & Lemeshow goodness-of-fit tests by task: Tube, χ2(2) = 1.31, p = .519; Ring, χ2(2) = 0.55, p = .761; 
Card, χ2(2) = 0.36, p = .837. Overall fit of final models: χ2(2) = 14.42, p = .001; Ring, χ2(2) = 21.09, p < .001; Card, 
χ2(2) = 30.34, p < .001. 
 
As Table 2.3 shows, investment predicted less continuing for the Ring and Card tasks, such 
that participants who had invested into the tasks were less likely to continue (opted out more) than 
participants in the choice conditions. In contrast, probability predicted a higher likelihood of 
continuing for all three tasks such that participants were more likely to continue when they had a 
higher probability of winning.  
2.1.3. Study Discussion 
The aim of Study 1 was to use behavioural tasks and investments to identify a potential sunk 
cost effect in adults. Three tasks were presented that required an investment of physical effort and 
time, with participants given the opportunity to win a larger, risky monetary reward for completion. 
Alternatively, a smaller monetary reward was offered for opting out of the task. For half of the 
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participants, the opportunity to opt out or continue was presented after completing 75% of the task 
(Investment conditions). It was hypothesized that if participants are susceptible to the sunk cost 
effect, they would be more likely to continue the task in theInvestment condition at greater rates 
than in the No Investment condition. However, we found the opposite – participants in the 
Investment conditions opted out more than participants in the No Investment conditions.  
It was also predicted that participants would continue in the higher probability conditions at 
higher rates than in the lower probability conditions. In line with this prediction, it was found that 
participants opted out less when they had a higher probability of winning the larger reward for 
continuing the tasks. This result is unsurprising given that a higher probability of winning would 
mean that participants would be expected to win more in these conditions.  
A reverse effect like the one found in the present results has been found in previous research 
(Heath, 1995; Zeelenberg & Van Dijk, 1997). One explanation for this is the physical effort 
involved in continuing. For example, participants in the investment conditions may have felt 
sufficiently disinterested, or tired, after completing 75% of the task to feel it not worth continuing 
for a risky gamble, regardless of the offered reward or probability of getting it. Indeed previous 
research has reported that strong visceral emotions or physiological states can influence decision-
makers (Loewenstein, 1996; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001), and this may especially 
be the case in the current study where behavioural investments were involved. When participants 
had to decide whether to continue or opt out of the tasks, knowing the nature of the task may have 
overridden any consideration of whether it was rational to continue - even if the money on offer is a 
salient reason to continue. Conversely, participants in the no investment conditions may have 
chosen to complete the tasks more because there was no preceding physical exertion to influence 
their decision. 
When participants were asked about their decisions, the responses were mixed. For example, 
when participants were asked about why they wanted to continue (or discontinue), nearly half 
(49%) of the reasons for continuing (or discontinuing) were related to the probability; both in 
investment and non-investment conditions. This suggests that probability may have been more 
important than any considerations of the effort invested. Previous research by Arkes and Hutzel 
(2000) found that participants can inflate the probability of success to justify a previous investment. 
In this study, a focus on the probability of winning the gamble may have meant that participants  
focused on the possibility of getting nothing more acutely when they had completed most of the 
task. If participants were gambling for two positive outcomes then this may have put more attention 
on the effort, however the potential expectation of receiving nothing as a possible outcome may 
have been too aversive. Combined with the significant finding that probability predicted opt out 
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behaviour, it is possible that the use of gambles may be inapppropriate as a reward schedule in an 
experiment of this nature.  
It is also possible that the results may be due to the unintended consequences of having a 
culturally diverse sample. As highlighted in the general introduction to this thesis, there is no reason 
to doubt that people of other cultures are susceptible to judgment and decision making biases. 
However, the study by Pattaratanakun and Mak (2015) shows that the way in which a sunk cost 
effect rises may be susceptible to subtle differences in the investment situation between people of 
different cultures. Although it is unclear how this may have operated in the present study it is 
possible that culture could have influenced the behaviour of participants differently between the 
Investment and No Investment conditions, resulting in a reverse-like effect (if the cultural 
background of participants were also different between the two investment conditions). While a 
reverse sunk cost effect resulting from cultural differences is an interesting and important finding 
for the broader goal of finding where the effect operates, it was not the intented goal of this study. 
Given the potential issues with using gambles as part of the reward schedule and the 
disinterest or salient physical exertion required to complete the tasks, the aim in Study 2 was to use 
different behavioural tasks with an altered reward schedule. Instead of requiring participants to 
physically move around the testing room, the participants completed the task at a table. In addition, 
Lego sets were used as more motivating tasks for participants to complete compared with those 
used previously. It was predicted that if participants were susceptible to the sunk cost effect, then 
they would continue for longer when they had invested more compared with when they had 
invested less. 
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Study 2 – The sunk cost effect in adults using Lego sets 
2.2.1. Summary 
The aim of Study 1 was to find a behavioural sunk cost effect using novel tasks. Despite 
predicting that participants would be more likely to continue doing the three tasks when they had 
already invested into them, the results did not reveal an effect and in fact found the opposite: a 
preference to do the tasks when no investment had been made. It is possible that a lack of 
motivation, the use of gambles, or tiredness explained the observed pattern of behaviour and results 
in that study.  
Study 2 was a further attempt to find the effect but this time using behavioural tasks that 
were intended to be more motivating and less physically demanding to complete than those in the 
first study. Half of the participants were presented with a small Lego set to assemble before a large 
Lego set. The other half simply assembled the large Lego set. The reward for completing the large 
Lego set was entries into a competition to win cinema tickets – although a time limit was set to 
make this practically impossible to do. Alternatively, participants had the opportunity to opt out of 
the task every two minutes and receive a single entry into the competition. It was predicted that if 
participants were susceptible to the sunk cost effect, they would opt out of the large Lego set later 
when they had completed the small Lego set first, compared with just completing the large Lego set 
on its own. Although participants were behaving similarly to those in the first study, the results 
failed to find a difference between the two conditions and therefore, there was no sunk cost effect. 
Unlike the first study, it is possible that the tasks used here were too motivating; participants may 
have wanted to participate for a period of time that had nothing to do with the investments or task 
itself. 
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2.2.2. Method 
Participants 
Sixty-three participants were recruited from a pool of first-year psychology undergraduates 
at a large metropolitan university. Three participants were excluded from analysis because they 
finished the Lego sets before the time ran out and another for taking over 30 minutes to complete 
the smaller Lego task (and therefore violating the task constraint to a larger degree than acceptable). 
The final sample of 59 participants included 17 males and 42 females with a mean age of 19 years 
(SD = 3.26 years). The majority of participants were from a Western cultural background with 
English as their first language (82%). Participants received a single course credit and entry into a 
competition to win two premium movie tickets valued at over $60.  
Design and Materials 
A between-subjects design was employed with Sunk Cost (No Investment versus 
Investment) as the primary factor. The main dependent variable of interest was the point in which 
participants decided to opt out of completing the task. In addition, the reasons for participants’ 
decision to opt out were also recorded. 
Three Lego Architecture sets were employed as the main behavioural task. The first Lego 
set was modelled off of the Farnsworth House (546 pieces); the second set was a model of the 
United Nations Headquarters (597 pieces); and the third set was a model of the Villa Savoye (660 
pieces). Although Lego Architecture sets generally reflect famous structures around the world, the 
three sets employed for this study were chosen as potentially lesser recognisable structures 
compared to others, such as the Eiffel tower or White House. When asked, the majority of 
participants indicated that they did not recognise the sets when concurrently presented with pictures 
of them. This was done to reduce the likelihood that any particular set would be chosen on the basis 
of personal preference and prior familiarity. Finally, a small Lego racecar set (100 pieces) was 
chosen as the task for participants in the high sunk cost condition. Table 2.4 shows the Lego sets 
used. 
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Table 2.4. 
Photographs of the Lego sets used for the experiment. 
Farnsworth House United Nations Headquarters 
 
 
Villa Savoye Racecar 
  
 
Across all conditions, detailed building instructions (as provided with the respective Lego 
packs) were provided to facilitate building the sets. In addition, a small orange Lego brick separator 
was provided to help separate any bricks in the event that a mistake was made. A table was used for 
participants to complete the assigned or chosen Lego task. A stopwatch was used to record their 
participant’s time and all sets were kept concealed behind a curtain. 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually and data collection took place in a small testing room 
at a university. A briefing of the study and short demographic questionnaire was provided at the 
beginning of the testing session. The Lego sets and other materials were kept behind a curtain and 
brought out when required. The experimenter then demonstrated how to use the brick separator and 
reiterated the requirements for building the Lego set. Participants were informed that the task was 
timed and that they would be given the opportunity to opt out every two minutes until the time limit 
was up. These instructions were similar across all conditions and the time limit was set at 40 
minutes. Participants in the high sunk cost conditions were also told that the time limit for the initial 
task was 10 minutes.  
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High sunk cost task. Participants in the high sunk cost condition were presented with the 
small Lego to build. The experimenter informed them that successful completion of the racecar 
would allow them to continue on and build one of the larger Lego architecture sets and hence, have 
the opportunity to enter the competition. A briefing of the Lego instructions was provided and the 
experimenter demonstrated how to use the brick separator to help reduce the likelihood of mistakes 
occurring. Unlike the main task participants were allowed (unknowingly) to continue beyond the 
10-min time limit when necessary and no opportunities to opt out were provided.  
Main task. The Lego architecture set was presented either upon completion of the racecar 
for high sunk cost participants, or at the beginning of the session for low sunk cost participants. 
Three photographs of the completed Lego sets were shown and participants were asked to choose 
which one they would like to build and whether they recognized any of the sets. No other 
information was provided about the three sets. 
Once the set had been chosen, the instructions and pieces were provided. The experimenter 
demonstrated how to use the brick separator and gave a brief of the building instructions (for 
example, that the instructions are very step-by-step and that each page shows which pieces are 
required for each step). Participants were instructed that they had 40 minutes to complete the task to 
obtain the 10 entries into the competition to win cinema tickets. Every two minutes, the participants 
were told how much time they had remaining and were offered the chance to opt out or continue. At 
the final opt out, participants were told that this was their final opportunity to opt out and were 
reminded that not opting out would result in no entries into the competition. 
Coding  
The point at which participants opted out was recorded. A point was awarded for each 2-min 
increment at which the participant decided to continue with the task. For example, if the participant 
opted out after 6 minutes they would receive a score of 3; if they opted out after 12 minutes they 
would score 6. Scores thus ranged from 1 to 20, with higher scores indicating a longer commitment 
to task completion.  
2.2.3. Results 
There was no correlation between age and opt out point, rs (59) = -.03, p = .805 and no 
effect of sex U = 302.50 , z = -.92, p = .361. Across the three different Lego sets, the step in the 
instruction manual that participants got to when they opted out and the point at which they opted 
out was positively correlated, rs (55) = .68, p < .001. The pattern of Lego set choice was significant 
(χ2 (2) = 13.86, p = .001), with the Farnsworth House as the most frequently chosen Lego set (n = 
30) and the Villa Savoye set chosen the least (n = 7). For participants in the no investment 
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condition, time taken on the small Lego task was not correlated with opt out point, r (27) = -.07, p = 
.655. These variables are not considered any further. 
A large majority (43%) of participants opted out either at the last possible point or not at all 
(M = 15.37, SD = 4.89). Although participants tended to opt out later in the No Investment 
condition (Moptout = 16.63, Mrank = 34.17), than the Investment condition (Moptout = 14.07, Mrank = 
25.69), this trend was non-significant, U = 310.00, z = -1.92, p = .055.  
2.2.4. Study Discussion 
The aim of Study 2 was a further attempt at using behavioural tasks but with a low versus 
high sunk cost. Three Lego architecture sets were presented to participants who had the choice of 
which one they wanted to complete. For half of the participants, this choice came after a mandatory 
pre-task of building a small Lego car; designed to be relatively easy but also add further investment 
into the task. Both groups of participants had the opportunity to win additional entries into a 
competition to win two premium movie tickets. However, it was predicted that a susceptibility to 
the sunk cost effect would lead people to continue for longer if they had completed the pre-task 
Lego set. Results failed to find an effect of this additional investment. 
Unlike Study 1, participants here were presented with tasks that were designed to be more 
desirable to complete. Indeed, when participants were asked to provide a reason for why they 
continued for as long as they did, many indicated that the task itself was fun, regardless of what 
stage of task completion they were at. In addition, the Lego sets were completed at a table, reducing 
the potentially salient physical exertion required to complete the task that may have explained the 
results in Study 1. While both of these factors may have helped to reduce the effect of physical 
tiredness and disinterest, it may have made the task too easy or engaging, and would explain why a 
large proportion continued for as long as possible. In other words, the tasks may have been 
motivating enough that participants chose to continue completing the Lego sets regardless of how 
much they had invested or whether they could finish them before the time limit expired. While this 
explanation is interesting itself, it reveals a limitation of using tasks that do not balance participant 
engagement or interest appropriately.  
Finally, and as is standard practice for this field of research, the majority of participants 
were first year psychology students. It is possible that different results would have been found had a 
more culturally heterogeneous sample been employed (e.g., Yoder, Mancha, & Agrawal, 2014), 
though it is unclear how a distinct sample might have led to clear sunk cost results that are absent 
here. Nonetheless, as has been called for in psychology more generally (Henrich, Heine, & 
Norenzayan, 2010), the research pursued here deserves replication in a broad range of social and 
cultural groups. Such research may lead to insights about the effect that are not documented here.  
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Given that the physical investment aspects of Studies 1 and 2 may have led to the 
suppression or reversal of a sunk cost effect, the aim for Study 3 was to determine whether or not an 
effect would emerge when the actual investment of effort and time was removed. As with the 
numerous examples from previous research (e.g., Arkes & Blumer 1985), this meant presenting 
hypothetical vignettes, but presenting the investment scenario that participants in Study 1 faced. If 
participants are susceptible to the sunk cost effect, then it was expected that they would indicate a 
higher likelihood of continuing when a task is framed as having most of it completed compared to 
when no effort had previously been exerted.  
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Study 3 – Hypothetical Follow-Up To Behavioural Tasks 
2.3.1. Summary 
Study 2 presented a further attempt to find a sunk cost effect using behavioural tasks. Lego 
sets were used as more motivating tasks and the reward schedule was changed so that it was no 
longer an explicit gamble. In addition, the tasks were completed at a table to reduce physical 
tiredness and participants had multiple opportunities to opt out of the tasks. The variations of 
reward, level of effort involved, investment, and task types used failed to elicit the effect. It is 
possible that the tasks were too enjoyable and that participants may have had a desire to participare 
regardless of their level of investment. 
The aim of Study 3 was to assess whether the tasks themselves, or the short-term nature of 
the previous two experiments, were not condusive to finding an effect. We therefore conducted a 
third study that used hypothetical scenarios of the Study 1 tasks. Although Lego building would be 
more interesting as a scenario, we used the Study 1 tasks to observe whether a sunk cost effect or 
reverse effect could also be found hypothetically. If an effect was found for hypothetical versions of 
the tasks when an effect was not found for the behavioural, then it would support the possibility that 
the effect does not always appear for actual investments of time and effort.  
One hundred and ninety-eight participants were presented with these scenarios on Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) platform. The participants were told to imagine being in the 
experimental situation that participants in Study 1 were in. Like Study 1, these participants were 
presented with the 3 different tasks – albeit hypothetically. Unlike Study 1 participants however, the 
reward amounts for opting out or continuing were also hypothetical and MTurk participants were 
simply paid for their participation. The reveseral found in Study 1 was not replicated here: no 
difference between No Investment and Investment conditions was found and hence, there was no 
sunk cost effect. One possible explanation is that the scenarios used in this study failed to elicit a 
feeling of investment, leading people to make a judgment based on the hypothetical gambles alone. 
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2.3.2. Method 
Participants 
One hundred and ninety-eight participants were recruited via the Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk) system. There were 120 males and 78 females with a mean age of 33.5 years (SD = 10.58). 
The majority of participants were born in the USA (94%) with the majority speaking English (98%) 
as a first language and 38% speaking additional, other languages. The questions took approximately 
five minutes to complete and participants were paid $0.50 USD. 
Design and materials 
A 2 x 2 between-participants design was employed with the amount of Investment (None 
versus High) as the first factor and Probability (Low versus High) as the second factor. A preamble 
was shown to provide a context for the three hypothetical tasks. In this preamble, the participants 
were told to imagine that they have signed up for a psychology experiment that takes an hour and 
will earn them $10 for participation, regardless of the outcome. They are also informed that they 
will have three physical tasks to do and that for each one, they have the opportunity to attain 
additional money. This preamble was the same for all participants. 
The hypothetical task scenarios were designed to encapsulate the behavioural tasks in Study 
1 as much as possible. For each scenario, the Tube, Card, or Ring tasks were described (a full list of 
the scenarios/vignettes used can be found in Appendix A). Examples of the scenarios that 
participants would see are shown: 
Investment High Probability. Imagine that for this task, you must fill up a clear, vertical tube with small 
wooden beads, one at a time, until the tube is completely filled. The beads are placed in a container, 
approximately 2 metres (6.5 feet) from the tube, meaning you must go a short distance each time you take 
a bead and put it in the tube. You are told that at some point, you will be given the opportunity to opt out of 
the task. Your performance is timed. 
 
After several minutes of doing the task, the experimenter stops you. You have already filled the tube with 
75 wooden beads and have 25 wooden beads left to complete the task. You are then given the following 
options: 
1. Opt out of completing the task, receive $2.50 for certain, and move on to the next task.  
2. Attempt the task, and if you complete it, a die is rolled. If the die comes up 1 to 3 you get nothing; if 
it comes up 4 to 6 you get $5. You then move on to the next task. 
Which option would you choose? 
Participants indicated their preference with Option 1 or Option 2 response buttons at the 
bottom of the screen. For those in the No Investment conditions, the scenarios were highly similar 
except that the ‘until the tube is completely filled’ part was replaced with ‘until 25 wooden beads 
have been put into the tube’. In addition, the ‘After several minutes of doing the task…’ component 
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was replaced with ‘Before you begin the task you are given the following options:’. For the low 
probability scenarios, the die roll outcomes were replaced with ‘1 to 5’ and ‘6’.   
Procedure 
All surveys were conducted through Qualtrics and participants signed up via the MTurk 
system. The majority of participants completed the study in less than 5 mintues and upon 
completion, a unique code was provided for each person to enter into MTurk to receive payment.  
Similar to Study 1, participants completed demographic questions before being allocated to 
one of the four Investment x Probability conditions. All participants were presented with three 
hypothetical scenarios, representing each of the tasks that were given in Study 1. In addition to the 
response options, the order of the task scenarios was counterbalanced between participants. 
Coding  
A score of 1 was given each time a participant chose to cash out or a 0 if they chose to 
complete the task; giving a total possible score of 3 for persisting to task completion. 
2.3.3. Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
The assumptions for using parametric tests were violated; therefore non-parametric tests 
were used where appropriate. No correlation was found between age and the frequency of opting 
out, r (198) = .035, p = .624 and no effect of sex was found U = 4505.50, z = -.57, p = .566. 
Main Analyses 
A high level of opting out was observed across the four conditions; with Investment 
participants opting out at an average level of 2.61 and 2.40 (Low and High probability respectively) 
and No Investment participants opting out at a mean of 2.56 and 2.31 (Low and High probability). 
Results revealed no significant difference in opting out between participants in the Investment 
conditions (Mrank = 101.41) and the No Investment conditions (Mrank = 97.59), U = 4711.00, z = -
0.61, p = .543, r = -.04. Similarly, there was no effect of probability (Low - Mrank = 105.40; High - 
Mrank = 93.60) on opting out, U = 4316.00, z = -1.88, p = .061, r = -.13. 
Analysing by task, it was found that investment did not predict opting out behaviour for any 
of the three tasks. The results of these logistic regressions are shown in Table 2.5. 
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Table 2.5.  
Investment and probability predicting opt out behaviour by task. 
0 0 0 0 0 00 95% CI 
Predictor β (SE) Wald df p Odds ratio Lower Higher 
Tube N/A N/A N N N/A N/A N/A 
Constant -1.44 (0.78) 3.38 1 .066 0.40 N/A N/A 
Investment -0.13 (0.36) 0.13 1 .715 0.88 0.43 1.78 
Probability 0.13 (0.36) 0.13 1 .715 1.14 0.56 2.32 
Ring N/A N/A N N N/A N/A N/A 
Constant -2.25 (0.89) 6.35 1 .012 0.59 N/A N/A 
Investment -0.33 (0.40) 0.66 1 .417 0.72 0.33 1.59 
Probability 0.65 (0.41) 2.49 1 .114 1.91 0.85 4.27 
Card N/A N/A N N N/A N/A N/A 
Constant -2.76 (0.85) 10.50 1 .001 0.20 N/A N/A 
Investment -0.08 (0.37) 0.04 1 .834 0.93 0.45 1.91 
Probability 0.90 (0.39) 5.42 1 .020 2.45 1.15 5.22 
Note. Hosmer & Lemeshow goodness-of-fit tests by task: Tube, χ2(1) = 0.09, p = .759; Ring, χ2(2) = 0.08, p = .960; 
Card, χ2(2) = 0.04, p = .979. Overall fit of final models: χ2(2) = 0.26, p = .877; Ring, χ2(2) = 3.21, p = .201; Card, χ2(2) 
= 5.76, p = .056. 
 
As Table 2.5 shows, a hypothetical investment did not predict participants’ willingness to 
continue or opt out for any of the scenarios. Probability predicted opt out behaviour, such that 
participants would indicate a willingness to continue the task when the probability was high for the 
Card scenario but not the Tube or Ring scenarios. 
2.3.4. Study Discussion 
The aim of Study 3 was to evaluate whether or not a sunk cost effect would emerge when 
hypothetical scenarios analagous to the behavioural tasks employed in Study 1 were employed and 
thus, validate the results found there. Whereas Study 1 found the reverse of a sunk cost effect when 
a physical investment of time and effort were involved, Study 3 found no difference (and therefore 
no sunk cost effect). Participants were no more likely to opt out after a hypothetical investment of 
time and effort had been made than when no investment had been made. With the exception of the 
Card task scenario, there was also no effect of probability on whether participants opted out or 
completed the task.  
With the physical investment of time and effort removed, participants tended to choose the 
sure option (and therefore opt out). Indeed, an overwhelming majority (74%) of participants chose 
to opt out for all three task scenarios across the different conditions while only 10% chose to 
continue on all three. One explanation for this result is that the removal of physically investing 
effort and time meant participants would not experience the same physiological tiredness or 
disinterest that may have lead to the reverse-like effect seen in Study 1. Finally, it is possible that 
describing an experimental situation in scenario format was too complicated. Imagining being in a 
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short-term experiment may not have lead participants to feel invested. The participants may have 
read the scenarios and ultimately ignored the majority of the contextual information that was 
provided. Given that the majority of participants opted out, it is possible that participants were 
simply making a choice between a sure, smaller gain versus a risky, larger gain (regardless of 
investment or task). This result would be in line with previous research on risk aversion (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979). 
Studies 1, 2, and 3 revealed either a reverse effect of investment or no effect at all. Given 
that no effect was found in Study 3 using hypothetical versions of the behavioural tasks used in 
Study 1, the aim of Study 4 was to investigate whether this might be due to the nature of the tasks 
used. Thus, in Study 4 we used a hypothetical scenario from the series of classical studies 
conducted by Arkes and Blumer (1985). Consistent with Arkes and Blumer’s findings, if 
participants are susceptible to the sunk cost effect, then an imagined investment into a project 
should produce a higher willingness to finish it compared with participants who do not have an 
investment. 
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Study 4 – Sunk Cost Replication With Chapter Discussion 
2.4.1. Summary 
Study 3 was an attempt to find a sunk cost effect using hypothetical versions of the tasks 
used in Study 1. These scenarios failed to find a sunk cost effect. Given the short-term and 
laboratory setting of the tasks described in these scenarios, it is possible that the hypothetical 
scenario versions of these tasks were too complicated for Study 3 participants to feel invested into 
them and hence, no sunk cost effect was found.  
The aim of Study 4 was an attempt to replicate one of the findings from the original 
psychological study of the sunk cost effect found in Arkes and Blumer (1985) but using a larger, 
and online, sample of participants. We wanted to ensure that the sunk cost effect could still be 
found in a contemporary sample, with successful replication informing the broader discussion of the 
contexts for where a sunk cost effect can and cannot be found. Two hundred and eighteen 
participants were recruited via MTurk and were randomly assigned to one of the radar-blank plane 
scenarios that was used in the original study. Results showed the sunk cost effect; with the 
proportions of participants indicating a willingness to continue the failing course of action at highly 
similar rate to the participants in the original Arkes and Blumer study indicated. The results of this 
replication suggest a possible limitation of short-term behavioural investments revealing a sunk cost 
effect.  
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2.4.2. Method 
Participants 
Two hundred and eighteen participants were recruited via MTurk. Of these participants, 138 
were males and 84 were females with a mean age of 32.45 years (SD = 10.77). The majority of 
participants were born in the USA (96%) with 99% of participants speaking English as their first 
language with 24% indicating that they spoke an additional language. Most participants completed 
the survey in less than five minutes and were paid $0.10 USD for their responses. 
Design and Materials 
Participants were randomly assigned to view a hypothetical vignette with an investment or 
no investment (sunk cost or no sunk cost) component. An information sheet was shown at the 
beginning in addition to the demographic information presented to participants in Study 2.  
The hypothetical vignettes were identical to the radar-blank plane ones used in Experiment 3 
of Arkes and Blumer (1985) series of sunk cost studies. For example, the Investment scenario was 
presented to participants as: 
As the president of an airline company, you have invested 10 million dollars of the company’s money 
into a research project. The purpose was to build a plane that would not be detected by conventional 
radar, in other words, a radar-blank plane. When the project is 90% completed, another firm begins 
marketing a plane that cannot be detected by radar. Also, it is apparent that their plane is much faster 
and far more economical than the plane your company is building. The question is: should you invest 
the last 10% of the research funds to finish your radar-blank plane? 
 
In this case, participants simply indicated whether they would finish the plane by selecting a 
yes or no response button. The No Investment scenario is similar (see Appendix A), however, the 
suggestion to build the plane comes from an employee and no money has been invested yet. 
Procedure 
All surveys were conducted through Qualtrics with participants recruited via MTurk. The 
screen set up of the survey was similar to participants in Study 3, with the order of the experiment 
presented in the following order: sheet, demographic information, sunk cost/no sunk cost vignette, 
and debrief sheet. Each one was shown on a separate screen. 
Coding 
A dummy-coded score of 1 was given when participants indicated a ‘yes’ response for 
finishing the project or 2 when they indicated a ‘no’ response.  
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2.4.3. Results 
As Figure 2.2 shows, participants were more likely to finish the plane in the Investment 
Condition (80%) than in the No Investment condition (24%), χ2 (1, N = 218) = 68.37, p < .001. 
 
Figure 2.2. Number of participants indicating a willingness to build the radar blank plane between 
the Investment (sunk cost) and No Investment (no sunk cost) conditions. 
2.4.4. Study Discussion 
It was hypothesised that if participants were susceptible to the sunk cost effect, then a higher 
willingness to finish an imagined project would be found when an hypothetical investment of 
money had been made compared with when no money had been invested. This hypothesis was 
supported, replicating the results found in Arkes and Blumer’s (1985) original study. Compared 
with Arkes and Blumer, this replication had twice the sample size and was conducted with a similar 
group of participants as Study 3: higher variability in ages and locations around the USA. Although 
a direct comparison to Study 3 cannot be made, the results reveal that a 30-year-old hypothetical 
investment scenario still elicits a sunk cost effect. Given the increasing focus on psychology’s 
replication crisis (Maxwell, Lau, & Howard, 2015; The-Open-Science-Collaboration, 2015) this is a 
valuable finding.  
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2.5. Interim General Discussion 
The research presented here aimed to find a sunk cost effect in short-term scenarios using 
behavioural measures. In Study 1, participants were presented with three tasks that required a 
physical invesment of time and effort. This resulted in a reverse sunk cost effect whereby 
participants were more likely to opt out after having completed the majority of the task. Given the 
potential problem of disinterest in the tasks and the use of gambles, the aim in Study 2 was to find a 
sunk cost effect using different behavioural tasks and a reward not contingent on gambles. This 
study failed to reveal a significant difference between a investment or no investment into the tasks. 
Physical or physiological factors may have explained this reversal, therefore participants in Study 3 
were presented with hypothetical vignettes that were analagous to the behavioural tasks in Study 1. 
No differences were found between the imagined investment or no investment conditions. The aim 
of Study 4 was to replicate the previous findings of Arkes and Blumer (1985) and observe whether 
a hypothetical scenario that is well-established in the literature reveals a sunk cost effect: It did. 
Taken together, these results suggest that short-term physical investments (real or imagined) in 
behavioural tasks reveal either a reverse sunk cost effect or fail to find an effect at all. This stands in 
contrast to the majority of published literature on the sunk cost effect (Arkes & Ayton, 1999; 
Magalhães & White, 2016). 
The results of the behavioural studies present a paradox. Study 1 participants in the no 
investment conditions could choose not to do any of the tasks, finish the experiment in less than 10 
minutes, and receive a guaranteed $17.50 for no effort expended. Yet these participants chose to do 
the task significantly more than those who had invested time and effort. Similarly, the majority of 
Study 2 participants indicated that they knew they could not finish the Lego sets (at least in 
hindsight) but continued despite there being no additional reward for opting out later. This 
highlights the delicate balance between the rewards on offer and the investment of time and effort 
to get them. We chose to have rewards that were technically higher for continuing but 
probabilistically less likely than opting out, because if a person can expect to win more money for 
continuing to complete a task, then it would be difficult to argue that it was the sunk cost that was 
influencing them to continue (if indeed, people did continue more in the sunk cost conditions).  
One explanation for the results found here is participants’ knowledge of the outcomes. In 
one of the studies conducted by Tan and Yates (1995), a sunk cost scenario was manipulated such 
that participants in the study knew both how much was invested previously, and how much could be 
expected if they decided to invest. This meant that participants could more easily calculate how 
much they stood to lose or gain by their decision. The result was that the sunk cost effect was 
reduced. While there was uncertainty built into the outcomes of the four studies described here, 
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participants still knew what the possible outcomes were if they opted out or continued the tasks. For 
example, participants could not predict whether they would win the larger sum of money in Study 
1, but they could calculate their probability of winning it and knew how much money could be won. 
In study 2 there was uncertainty about whether participants could finish the Lego tasks in time but 
they knew exactly what they would get for opting out or completing the task.   
It is also possible that a lack of interest or a high level of enjoyment could explain the 
respective results of Studies 1 and 2 and therefore the rewards were not calibrated well enough to 
match the behavioural investments that were required. Another possibility is that participants were 
choosing to do the tasks to justify participating in the experiment, given that time had been invested 
signing up for the studies and getting to the test rooms. There is a sense in which the justification to 
participate in these behavioural studies is a sunk cost, albeit in an unintended way. As already 
mentioned, research has found that people often have a “mental account” of what they are willing to 
spend (in money or time) on something (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Heath, 1995; Soman, 2001). If 
participants had mentally accounted for the period of time allocated to participating in an 
experiment, this could explain why the no-sunk cost participants chose to complete the tasks in 
Study 1, or why participants were opting out late in the Lego tasks of Study 2.  
Another explanation for the results found here is participant’s knowledge of the outcomes. 
In one of the studies conducted by Tan and Yates (1995), a sunk cost scenario was manipulated 
such that participants in the study knew both how much was invested previously, and how much 
could be expected if they decided to continue to invest. This meant that participants could more 
easily calculate how much they stood to lose or gain by their decision. The result was that the sunk 
cost effect was reduced. While there was uncertainty built into the outcomes of the four studies 
described here, participants still knew what the possible outcomes were if they opted out or 
continued the tasks. For example, in Study 1, the lottery . In study 2 the uncertainty was with 
regards to being able to complete the task itself but the reward for doing so was known. 
One approach to rectify the effect of participating is to have participants across all of the 
conditions engage with a pre-task first. Navarro and Fantino (2009) used pre-tasks for this very 
reason. While the inclusion of a pre-task in Study 1 may have enhanced the effect of effort seen in 
participants in the investment conditions, it may have countered the effect of “participation” for 
those in the no investment conditions. Having the experimenter present may have exacerbated this, 
with participants feeling “judged”. Keeping the experimenter away from the participants may 
reduce this. However, given that the results we obtained were significant in the opposite direction to 
that predicted, it is not clear that this would have been sufficient to produce a large enough change 
that would have represented a sunk cost effect. Further, a pre-task was not included as it was hoped 
that the choice, prior to any physical effort being invested, would serve as an appropriate baseline. 
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Although Study 2 included a pre-task as the extra invesment component, this similarly failed to 
reveal a sunk cost effect. It is possible that an unrelated pre-task requiring less, or no physical effort 
investments for low or non-sunk cost conditions would help to rectify this issue in any future 
studies that required them.  
The collective results of the studies presented here reveal a possible limit of the sunk cost as 
a bias where short-term investments have been made into tasks and the reward is not sufficiently 
large. It is possible that for many of the hypothetical situations described here and in previous 
research, the temporal separation between the investment being made and the decision to continue 
can be large. For example, when a large scale project such as the radar-blank plane scenario is 
described, it is likely that such an (imagined) investment has been made over the course of months 
and that the decision to (dis)continue will be subject to scrutiny by others. 
This issue of scruitiny and the effect of accountability on sunk cost decisions has been 
examined before, with researchers suggesting that people are less susceptible to the effect when 
they are aware of the bias and are accountable for their decisions (Simonson & Nye, 1992). In 
contrast, there are popular examples of politicians justifying the honouring of sunk costs because of 
the perceived backlash from taxpayers that would occur if they stopped investing (Arkes & Blumer, 
1985). As with previous research however, the extent to which this translates to other real-life 
decisions is not clear; or how accountability would interact with other variables such as personal 
responsibility, that have been shown to increase a person’s likelihood of committing the sunk cost 
effect (Garland, 1990; Staw, 1976). Participants in Study 2 had the option of which Lego set they 
chose, however there was no accountability or scrutiny over this decision. In addition, we cannot be 
sure how responsible participants feel for their decision to commit to their chosen set and hence, the 
extent to which this affected their propensity for contuining to build them. One solution for future 
research would be to include choice, and therefore responsibility, of the Lego set, as well as 
introducing positive/negative feedback of their choice. 
In sum, it is possible that short-term behavioural investments of physical effort either do not 
elicit a sunk cost effect (or even a reversal), or that laboratory experiments are problematic for 
consistently revealing it. While numerous examples of people committing the sunk cost effect using 
hypothetical investments has been documented across a number of domains (Arkes & Blumer, 
1985; Braverman & Blumenthal-Barby, 2012; Garland, 1990; Park & Jang, 2014; Staw & Hoang, 
1995), only a small number of studies have examined the sunk cost effect using tasks that require 
behavioural investments (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Coleman, 2009, 2010; Cunha Jr & Caldieraro, 
2009; Navarro & Fantino, 2009). While these behavioural studies provide some evidence that 
investments of effort or time can elicit a sunk cost effect, it is unclear how, or under what 
conditions, these investments do so. Ongoing investigation of the parameters under which a sunk 
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cost effect is evident are thus needed, especially given the potentially large cost, from the individual 
to the societal level, of persisting with an endeavour that has a low possibility of yielding desired 
outcomes. 
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Chapter 3 – Sunk Costs Using a Card Sorting Game 
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Abstract 
The collective results of the novel studies in Chapter 2 failed to find a sunk cost effect. The present 
study was a final attempt at finding a sunk cost effect for short-term behavioural investments. We 
used a modified version of the Card Sorting Task from the first study in Chapter 2. One hundred 
and two participants completed a computerised version of the task via MTurk. The reward for 
completing the task was 30 tokens exchangeable for 30 entries into a competition to win a $30 
Amazon gift card. Participants started the experiment with a Low (10 tokens) or High (20 tokens) 
level of tokens and had to invest them to continue the task. If they chose to opt out they were told 
they would receive their remaining tokens-as-entries into the competition. It was predicted that if 
participants were susceptible to the sunk cost effect then they would be more likely to opt out at a 
later stage in the game when they had invested more tokens. In addition, participants also completed 
a 13-item Risk Tolerance Survey to assess whether a higher propensity for risk-taking was 
correlated with opting out of the task. Results failed to find a sunk cost effect and no relationship 
was found between risk tolerance and opting out. 
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3.1. Introduction  
The behavioural tasks employed in the first study of Chapter 2 may not have revealed a sunk 
cost effect for the investment conditions because they were not motivating enough for participants 
to continue after having expended effort into their completion. That is, after having put a large 
amount of physical effort and time into the tasks, participants were more likely to opt out because 
the possibility of winning more money was outweighed by the costs of the tasks being uninteresting 
and tiring. To control for this, the third study utilised hypothetical vignette versions of these tasks 
but still failed to reveal a sunk cost effect. 
In the second study of Chapter 2, Lego sets were used as a way of motivating participants 
and hence counteracting some of the issues that may have produced the results in the first study. 
Despite changing the task and reward (entries into a competition) this also failed to produce a sunk 
cost effect; with participants largely continuing the tasks until the end or close to the end of the 
experiment. In contrast to the tasks presented in the first study, use of Lego sets may have been too 
motivating for participants to care about any reward contingency or sunk costs involved. The final 
study of Chapter 2 successfully replicated the radar-blank plane used previously by Arkes and 
Blumer (1985), showing that the effect can still occur hypothetically.  
The study described in the current chapter was a final attempt at trying to identify the sunk 
cost effect using an altered, and computerised version of the Card Sorting Task from Chapter 2. The 
rationale for using this task was to preserve the monotonous nature of it, without the potentially 
interfering effects of physical tiredness and effort that may have produced the results found in 
Chapter 2. In addition, features of the studies from the previous chapters were utilised. For example, 
the opportunity to stop playing the game at multiple points was a feature of the Lego study that was 
used to observe variance in participant’s opting out behaviour. Unlike the previous studies however, 
tokens-as-entries into a competition were the investment as well as the reward. In other words, 
participants would have to use a pool of tokens to do the task and the number of tokens required to 
continue doing the task would vary between participants. From these modifications, it was predicted 
that if participants were susceptible to sunk costs then they would continue the task for longer when 
they had invested more. 
A final goal of this study was to examine a possible reason for why participants might 
continue doing a task or not, in the short-term behavioural context. Previous literature has examined 
if factors such as decision-making competence, cognitive capacity or general cognitive ability 
predict whether or not people use heuristics or biases like framing, overconfidence, and sunk cost 
effect (Morsanyi & Handley, 2008; Parker & Fischhoff, 2005; Parker & Weller, 2015; Toplak, 
West, & Stanovich, 2017). Another factor that may be important for why people may continue to 
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invest into something is risk-taking. Risk-taking can occur across domains including financial, 
social or recreational risks (Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002). Types of risk-taking, such as financial, 
have been shown to be correlated with a propensity for other types of risk-taking (Hanoch, Johnson, 
& Wilke, 2006). 
Risk-taking is of interest here because many of the decision-making situations where a sunk 
cost effect could occur involve a form of gambling. For example, if a company has invested 
millions of dollars into a project, they are gambling both for the possibility that the project will be 
successful, and that the project will yield a profit in the future. An issue left unanswered by the 
previous chapter is whether or not participants’ decision to continue doing tasks, particularly when 
there is a gamble or risk involved, is influenced by their propensity for risk-taking. It is possible that 
participants in the first study of Chapter 2 were ignoring the context of the tasks and making a 
simple choice between a risky gamble or guaranteed money. If the choice was this simple then their 
propensity for taking risky gambles might better explain the results of that study rather than level of 
investment. Although there was a significant difference between the two conditions on opt out 
behaviour, it could be that other confounding factors (e.g. tiredness) influenced a relationship 
between risk-taking for gambles and opting out that otherwise may have existed. 
One reason for the occurrence of the sunk cost effect is that participants who have invested 
into something become risk-seeking in the hopes of avoiding the loss that would occur if they did 
not continue to invest (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Thaler, 1980). This means that in the presence of a 
sunk cost, people will continue in the hopes of a positive outcome. However, if people have a 
higher tolerance for risk then it also means that people may continue to do a task because their 
tendency for taking risks leads them to gamble for a larger reward, regardless of the investment. In 
this case, we would predict that people who are more risk-seeking would continue doing a 
behavioural task for longer than less risk-tolerant people, even in the absence of a sunk cost. 
Therefore, rather than sunk costs influencing people to continue the task (in hopes of justifying the 
investment of time and effort), it is a propensity to take risky gambles (or financial risks) that is the 
primary influence. To investigate this, a survey was presented at the end of the experimental task, 
assessing participants on their tolerance towards various types of financial risks. It was predicted 
that those who opted out later (and therefore were gambling for a larger reward) would have a 
higher tolerance for risk-taking. 
3.2. Method 
Participants 
One hundred and nine participants were recruited via MTurk. Of the final sample, there 
were 44 Females and 65 Males with a mean age of 32.24 years (SD = 8.92). The majority of 
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participants were born in the USA (96%) with English as a first language (97%). The average time 
to complete the entire experiment was 20 minutes and each participant was paid $2 USD. 
Design and materials 
A between participants design was employed where the amount of investment (Low versus 
High) was varied. An instruction screen was presented (white text on black background) to provide 
information on how to complete the task. Thirty Tokens, exchangeable for entries into the 
competition to win a $30 Amazon Gift Card, were used. 
The difference between the Low and High Investment conditions was the number of tokens 
provided. For participants in the Low Investment condition, 10 tokens were provided at the 
beginning and the cost to play each round was 1 token. In the High Investment condition, 20 tokens 
were provided at the beginning but the cost to play was higher. The cost for High Investment 
condition participants was: 3 tokens for the first, second, third, and fourth rounds; 2 tokens for the 
fifth and sixth rounds; 1 token for the final four rounds. Thus, on any given round, participants in 
the High Investment condition will have invested more tokens to do the task than someone in the 
Low Investment condition. By the sixth round, participants in both conditions have the same 
number of tokens left, however the prior investment of tokens will be higher for the High 
Investment group than the Low Investment group. The decreasing cost of doing the task for High 
Investment conditions was done to protect against the possibility that participants would opt out of 
the task simply because the cost of continuing was higher rather than considering how much they 
had invested. An example of the task instruction screen at the beginning for the High Investment 
condition is shown in Figure 3.1.  
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Figure 3.1. An example of the task instruction screen for a participant in the High Investment 
condition. 
 
Similar to Chapter 2, the basic task was to sort coloured cards into four piles of 50, 
according to their colour with the goal of receiving the 30 tokens as entries to win the $30 Amazon 
Gift Card. Each round, participants had to “sort” 20 cards, and they had 10 rounds to complete this 
task. During any round, the number of coloured cards was fixed for all participants, however the 
order of their appearance was randomised. Unlike Chapter 2 however, the number of cards of each 
colour was manipulated so that the task could not be completed in the available rounds. The amount 
of cards of each colour for any particular participant was: 30, 40, 50, and 80 cards each. This means 
that participants had to discard cards, once the overrepresented colour reached 50 cards. The 
rationale for this manipulation, along with having more tokens, was to encourage participants to opt 
out early. 
In addition, the overrepresented and underrepresented colours changed between participants. 
For example, in the first turn, a participant (irrespective of condition) has 20 cards to sort into their 
respective piles. If the overrepresented card was green, then the first twenty cards had 10 green, 3 
red, 4 blue, and 3 yellow. If red was the overrepresented card then there was 3 green, 10 red, 4 blue, 
and 3 yellow. Thus, on any round, all participants within each colour overrepresentation were 
presented with the same number of coloured cards. Figure 3.2 shows an example of the 
experimental screen at the beginning for the High Investment condition.  
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Figure 3.2. An example of the experimental screen for a participant in the High Investment 
condition, at the beginning of the experiment. Each pile had a counter for the number of cards 
placed that updated as participants completed the task. 
 
At the end of a round, a new screen would appear with a summary of information. This 
information included how many tokens were remaining; how many tokens it would cost to continue 
playing; and how many cards of each colour they had sorted. At this point, participants could 
choose to opt out or continue doing the task by selecting one of the buttons. All participants had to 
complete the first round and thus, they had 9 opportunities to opt out or continue doing the task. 
Figure 3.3 shows an example of an opt out screen for the High Investment condition. 
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Figure 3.3. An example of the opt out screen for a participant in the High Investment condition, 
after 1 round of completing the task. 
 
A Risk Tolerance survey was presented to participants after the experimental task. This 13-
question survey was designed to assess risk tolerance with reference to a number of hypothetical 
situations (Grable & Lytton, 1999). An example of a question was: 
Given the best and worst case returns of the four investment choices below, which would you prefer? 
o $200 gain best case; $0 gain/loss worst case 
o $800 gain best case; $200 loss worst case 
o $2,600 gain best case; $800 loss worst case 
o $4,800 gain best case; $2,400 loss worst case 
 
For each option of the questions, the level of risk varies. Higher risk options are scored to a 
higher degree, with a high overall score representing a high level of risk tolerance (see Coding 
section). According to Grable and Lytton (1999) the survey items assess risk tolerance in three 
ways: investment risk, risk comfort and experience, and speculative risk. The survey was found to 
have acceptable internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = 0.75). 
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Procedure 
Participants were recruited via MTurk. They first completed demographic information in 
Qualtrics before being randomly allocated to one of the two Investment conditions. Instructions 
were presented and participants could advance through the experiment at their own pace. Other than 
the number of tokens available, the procedure was identical between the two conditions. 
When the experimental screen appeared, participants had to click and hold a card from the 
bottom left “pile” and place it near the corresponding pile of the placement area. If they let go of the 
card or tried to place the card anywhere other than the correct pile or discard pile, then the card 
would automatically be returned to the initial pile. Once the overrepresented pile reached 50 cards, 
any additional cards of that colour had to be placed in the Discard Pile for the participant to 
proceed.  
The process of card placement was repeated for each round until 20 cards had been placed 
in their correct piles. At the end of the round, the participant had the opportunity to opt out of the 
task or continue. The experiment ended when 10 rounds had taken place or the participant chose to 
opt out. Upon completion of the experiment, they were then redirected back to Qualtrics to fill out 
the risk tolerance survey and read the debrief. The order of the experiment was: Information screen, 
demographic information, card-sorting task (low/high sunk cost variants), risk tolerance survey, and 
debrief screen (with competition email entry). Each of the above steps occurred on a separate 
screen. Thus, all aspects of the experiment and risk tolerance survey were the same between 
conditions except for the number of tokens invested. 
Coding 
The dependant variable of interest was the point at which participants opted out (1-10) and 
this was recorded for each participant. A score of 1 meant that a participant opted out after the first 
round and a score of 10 indicated that they did not opt out but instead continued the task until the 
end. The Risk Tolerance Quiz was scored such that participants received a score between 1 and 4 
for each question, depending on the number of options for each question. For example, Question 1 
had 4 options, where a score of 4 was given for option a, 3 for option b, 2 for option c, and 1 for 
option d. For question 9, a score of 1 was given to option a and 3 for option b. The sum total of the 
scores was the measure of risk tolerance (Range: 13 – 47), with higher scores representing a higher 
risk tolerance (Questions and scoring scheme for the Risk Tolerance survey can be found in 
Appendix B).  
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3.3. Results 
Preliminary Analysis 
As with the previous studies, non-parametric tests were used where appropriate and 
applicable. Age was positively correlated with opting out, rs (104) = .266, p = .016, but not with 
risk tolerance scores, r (104) = .13, p = .196. Despite the age-opting out correlation, age did not 
significantly differ between the two experimental conditions t (102) = -.73, p = .467. Finally, there 
was no difference in opting out between Males and Females U = 1409.00, z = -1.33, p = .896. 
Main Analyses 
The Mean opt out point for the Low Investment condition was 5.09 (SD = 3.46) and 4.95 
(SD = 3.88) for the High Investment condition, however nearly half of participants opted out at 
either the first (n = 30) or final opportunity (n = 29). Despite this, there was no significant effect of 
token investment between the Low (Mrank = 56.45) and High (Mrank = 53.57) Investment conditions 
on opting out, U = 1406.50, z = -0.49, p = .629 r = .03. 
The mean Risk Tolerance score was 24.24 (SD = 5.47). Scores on the Risk Tolerance survey 
were correlated with participants’ opt out points to see if a relationship existed between risk 
tolerance and persistence (opting out) with the task. We found no significant relationship between 
the two, rs (102) = -.085, p = .393. Finally, there was no effect of token investment between the 
Low (M = 24.46, SD = 5.14) and High (M = 24.02, SD = 5.82) Investment conditions on Risk 
Tolerance scores, t (100) = .41, p = .686, 95% CI [-1.72, 2.60], d = .08. 
3.4. Discussion 
The study described in the present chapter was a final attempt to find a sunk cost effect 
using a variation of the tasks/rewards/procedures of the previous chapters. It was predicted that if 
participants were susceptible to the sunk cost effect, then they would be more likely to continue 
when the cost to play the Card Sorting task was higher. As with previous chapters, no sunk cost 
effect was found. Participants were no more likely to opt out later when they had invested more 
tokens than when they had invested fewer tokens.  
An additional aim of the study was to evaluate whether a propensity for risk-taking is related 
to a propensity to opt out. However, no relationship was found between these variables. A possible 
explanation for the lack of relationship is that financial risk tolerance (and therefore risk-taking), as 
measured by the survey used here, does not tap into the same construct that would lead someone to 
continue a task. Indeed, previous research suggests that someone who takes risks in one domain 
may not necessarily take risks in another (Weber et al., 2002), however financial and recreational 
risk-taking has been shown to co-occur (Hanoch et al., 2006). That is, whether someone continues 
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to do a task or not (gambling for a reward) is unrelated to how willing they are to take financial 
risks in general. The tenets of Prospect Theory predict that participants would be more risk-seeking 
when they had invested more tokens into the task. In a recent review however, it was found that this 
may not occur for simple gambles that are actually experienced, rather than described in a scenario 
(Rakow & Newell, 2010). The “gamble” in the present study was not as simple or explicit as a 
choice between, for example, a 10% chance of winning $10 or $1 for sure, but it is possible that the 
experience of completing the task and deciding whether to risk losing their tokens for a potentially 
larger reward was enough for participants’ propensity for risk-taking to not matter.  
Alternatively, it is possible that the use of a gamble for a gift card did not appropriately tap 
into a relationship between investment and propensity to take risks that may in fact exist. While the 
use of money and gambles did not produce a sunk cost effect in Chapter 2, future studies should 
consider using a monetary investment and reward scheme that more appropriately trigger a 
relationship between financial risk-taking and propensity to invest resources. For example, small 
amounts of money could again be used instead of tokens. This could still avoid the problems of 
having an explicit gamble like the first study in Chapter 2, while making participants more invested 
in the task and the potential reward for completing it. Although this would not necessarily provide a 
definitively causal explanation (e.g. personality or dispositional traits might predict risk-taking), it 
would provide a basis for future research. 
Notably, age was correlated with opting out such that older participants tended to opt out 
later than younger participants. This unexpected relationship is in contrast to the studies described 
in the previous chapters, which found no relationship between age and sunk cost measures. In 
addition, the broader research examining the sunk cost effect across the lifespan shows that older 
people are less likely to commit the sunk cost effect (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2012; Bruine de Bruin 
et al., 2014; Strough et al., 2016; Strough et al., 2011; Strough et al., 2014). Taken together, this 
suggests that the relationship between age and opting out found in the present study is either 
spurious, or reflects an unmeasured variable that is unrelated to the sunk cost effect. 
The present study failed to find a sunk cost effect. There are a number of explanations for 
why an effect may not have been found. Like the Lego experiment from Chapter 2, it is possible 
that the tokens-as-entries for the competition to win a gift card were not sufficient motivators for 
participants to care about the outcome. In addition, if participants are paid to do the experiment at 
all, then any other reward offered as part of completing it is a bonus. The difference between opting 
out later and only having a few exchangeable tokens compared with opting out early and having 
many may not matter for a competition that participants were not expecting to enter until they had 
signed up through MTurk and followed through to the beginning of the experiment. Similarly, the 
complexity of the scenario/task may have also lead many participants to not engage or feel 
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motivated to keep persisting. Indeed, half of the participants in the sample opted out either at the 
first opportunity or not at all and the results show that the number of tokens invested cannot explain 
this difference. Therefore, participants who opted out early may have done so because of their lack 
of understanding, interest, or both. A simple check could have established this and future research 
with novel tasks should utilise this to ensure their validity for finding an effect. 
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4.1. General discussion 
Five studies were conducted to explore the sunk cost effect in adults. One study was a 
replication of a previously used hypothetical scenario by Arkes and Blumer (1985) and another was 
a hypothetical version of some of the behavioural tasks used in the other studies. Despite variations 
in tasks and reward, the four novel studies did not find a sunk cost effect but the replication did. 
This chapter will examine the findings in more detail and discuss how these findings fit within the 
context of the wider sunk cost literature. I’ll begin this chapter with a summary of the findings of 
each study from the previous chapters of this thesis. 
4.2. Chapter 2 
A series of studies were conducted to observe a sunk cost effect in adults using behavioural 
measures. The first study used three novel tasks that required effort and time. Participants 
completed all three tasks and had the opportunity to gamble and win up to $15 to complete them 
(on top of $10 for participation) or a guaranteed additional $7.50 for opting out of doing the tasks. 
Half of the participants had the opportunity to opt out for the smaller, but guaranteed reward before 
completing any of the tasks while the other half had to complete most of the task before getting this 
opportunity. It was expected that having already invested into the tasks, people would be more 
likely to finish the task and gamble for the larger reward. The rationale here being that they had 
already invested into the task and would be willing to gamble to make that previous investment 
worth the effort and time.  
The results not only failed to find a sunk cost effect, but found an effect in the reverse 
direction. One explanation is that the use of gambles for the rewards inadvertently influenced 
participants’ decision-making process. It was important not to make the gambles favourable for 
continuing the tasks because then it would not be irrational to continue (regardless of the previous 
investments). Gambles in general however, can be problematic because for a short-term task, it is 
possible that the decision to continue or opt out of the tasks may have been driven by a simple 
choice to gamble or not. Indeed, the results also showed that the probability of winning the gamble 
was a significant predictor of opting out. In this case, having a higher probability of winning meant 
less opting out. If participants were feeling a lack of motivation or were feeling tired from the tasks 
then the importance of the gamble and reward may have taken salience in the decision-making 
process. Thus, the aim of the second study was to address these potential issues.  
The second study was a further attempt to find a sunk cost effect but using tasks that were 
more motivating, less physically effortful, and did not have gambles as part of the reward schedule. 
Lego architecture sets were used and participants had the choice of one of three to complete. For 
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half of the participants, a pre-task of another small Lego set had to be built before moving on to the 
larger one. In all instances, participants were completing the task for the possibility of winning two 
premium cinema tickets. Unlike Study 1, these participants had multiple opportunities to opt out or 
continue completing the target task. It was predicted that if participants were susceptible to a sunk 
cost effect, they would opt later when they had completed the smaller Lego set first (i.e. more effort 
and time invested), compared to the participants that just completed the large Lego set. 
The results of this study also failed to find a sunk cost effect. There was no difference 
between the investment and no investment conditions on opt out behaviour. Observing the pattern 
of opting out, quickly revealed that the tasks were desirable enough that participants were largely 
continuing the task until the end (or close to the end), regardless of previous investment or potential 
reward. This is despite the fact that the task was not even close to being finished and since the Lego 
instructions and pieces were always available to participants, it is likely they were aware that they 
weren’t going to finish before the time limit expired. This study presented a problem in contrast to 
the first study. Participants were so motivated by the tasks that other considerations, such as the 
sunk costs, did not seem to factor into their decision-making. If sunk costs were a factor then it did 
not vary with the experimental conditions.  
Following the completion of Study 2 it was clear that there was a need to determine whether 
there were characteristics of the tasks being used that was leading to no effect. Although moving 
away from the initial aim of the thesis, it was important to observe whether a sunk cost effect could 
be found using a methodology that had worked in previous research. Study 3 then, was a 
hypothetical study. The experimental situation of Study 1 was translated into hypothetical scenarios 
that were presented to participants on MTurk. The experimental setup was described precisely, with 
the behavioural effort and time component removed. In addition, there was compensation for 
completing the study but the gambles and monetary amounts for participants’ decisions in the 
vignettes were hypothetical. Similar to the first study it was predicted that when participants were 
told they had made an investment into the tasks, they would be more likely to indicate a willingness 
to continue and gamble for a larger reward. 
If it was true that the physical effort and motivation involved were affecting people when 
they had actually completed the tasks, then they should not be affected in the hypothetical domain. 
Results however, showed that there was still no effect. There was also no reverse effect like the one 
found in Study 1. Given that gambles presented a possible problem in Study 1, they may have also 
presented a problem here, even if they were only hypothetical. The removal of actual investments of 
time and effort may have meant that participants were simply making a choice between a risky 
gamble or money for sure and were disregarding the context of participating in an experiment. As a 
result, a sunk cost effect did not arise. 
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The final study of the chapter was a replication of one of the hypothetical scenarios used by 
Arkes and Blumer (1985). It was possible that the tasks used in the other three studies were 
problematic for finding a sunk cost effect. It was also possible, although unlikely, that the effect 
described by Arkes and Blumer no longer held up. Thus, replication was important to ensure that 
the results were not simply due to an effect that cannot be found. To that end, we presented the 
radar-blank plane scenario to a sample of participants on MTurk. Other than the delivery and 
sample type, the scenario was unchanged from the original study. Like the original, a sunk cost 
effect is indicated by a willingness to finish a failing project because a large amount of money has 
already been invested into it. The results of this replication found a sunk cost effect and one with a 
bigger, more representative sample than the original. Furthermore, participants indicated a sunk cost 
response to almost the same degree as those in Arkes and Blumer.  
The collective results of the studies in Chapter 2 demonstrated that if a sunk cost effect is 
present for behavioural investments, the tasks used here were unable to find it. The replication 
suggests that an effect at least exists hypothetically and although this is an important finding in its 
own right, it did not answer the questions set out by this thesis.   
4.3. Chapter 3 
The third chapter was a final attempt at finding a sunk cost effect using short-term 
behavioural investments. The studies in the previous chapter highlighted a need to use tasks that 
balanced a number of factors that may affect short-term decision-making. If participants were not 
motivated by the tasks then their behaviour might have lead them to disregard their investments into 
them. If the tasks were too motivating then participants would not have had a problem doing them, 
even if they knew they would not finish them (and regardless of investment or reward). Gambles 
may also be problematic; with some people willing or less willing to take gambles regardless of the 
context. This latter point was something that the study in chapter 3 was aimed at investigating. 
Participants were presented with a modified, and online version of a task used in the first 
study of Chapter 2. Other aspects of the previous studies were used as well. For example, by 
completing the task online, there was an investment component that took time and effort, but not 
the physical kind that was present in the other studies. Multiple opportunities to opt out were also 
given, with feedback for participants to keep track of their progress. Unlike the other studies 
however, the explicit difference in investment was the number of tokens used to continue doing the 
task. All other aspects of the study were the same except that one group had a higher cost to play 
the game and hence, a higher sunk cost was present. It was predicted that this higher cost would 
lead participants to continue for the possibility of winning more tokens compared to the group that 
had a lower cost to play. 
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Participants completed a survey on risk tolerance at the conclusion of the experiment to 
gauge whether people’s tolerance for financial risk (or tendency for risk-taking) was related to opt 
out behaviour. We were interested in a potential reason for people’s tendency to opt out that might 
explain the observed results. As mentioned previously, gambles may have been problematic for the 
studies because not only might a person’s decision be based on weighing up the gamble (regardless 
of investment in the task) but also their choice to gamble or not might be based on their propensity 
for risk-taking. In other words, if an investment situation or task is perceived to simply be a gamble 
then the likelihood of them taking that gamble could be explained by how likely they are to take 
risks generally. As participants were taking a risky gamble by continuing to do the tasks in the first 
study, continuing to do the task in the second study also constituted a risk because they could 
receive no tokens for failing to complete the tasks. It was therefore predicted that participants who 
scored higher on the risk tolerance questionnaire (and hence, a higher propensity for risk-taking) 
would be more likely to continue the task or opt out later in the task. 
While the majority of people either opted out at the beginning or near the end of the 
experiment, this did not vary significantly based on how many tokens they had invested into the 
task. As with the previous studies, the differential investment of tokens may not have been strong 
enough to elicit a consideration that would lead to sunk cost behaviour. In other words, investment 
had no effect on opt out behaviour and therefore no sunk cost effect. Furthermore, there was no 
relationship between participants’ risk tolerance scores and opt out behaviour, suggesting that risk-
taking was not related to behaviour in this experiment. One reason for this is that participants may 
not have seen the investment of tokens-as-entries as worth caring about, like money (compared to 
Study 1). This is potentially because the tokens themselves were not worth anything on their own 
and hence, may not have influenced people’s decisions to continue or opt out of the tasks. As 
mentioned in the Chapter 3 discussion, there is research to suggest that risk-taking in one domain 
will not necessarily lead to risk-taking in another domain (Hanoch et al., 2006), despite what might 
be predicted under Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  
4.4. Implications and interpretations 
This thesis had a number of goals. One goal was to find tasks that could be later adapted for 
use with children because of the limited amount of research examining the early development of a 
sunk cost effect. To that end, another goal was to develop and use tasks that examined behavioural 
investments in adults, demonstrating that the effect occurs across multiple contexts and especially 
when actual investments of time, effort, and money are involved. Despite multiple variations in 
context, task and rewards, none of the novel studies here were able to show a sunk cost effect. 
There are limitations to the studies, and these will be explained in more detail below (with 
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suggestions for future research). Nonetheless, the results presented here have a few implications 
that are worth discussing. 
As outlined in the interim discussion of Chapter 2, it is possible that there is a limit to sunk 
costs having an effect for short-term behavioural investments. Although the research cited in this 
thesis demonstrate that an effect in a laboratory setting is possible, the results of the studies here 
show that this may not be a consistently optimal context for conducting research on this effect. In 
particular, the results of the first two studies highlight the fact that participants may engage with a 
behavioural task because of the commitment involved in signing up to do an experiment. This 
means that completing the tasks for a certain amount of time was justification for participating in 
the experiment in the first place. For example, participants in the first study who had the choice to 
do the tasks upfront could have opted out and left the experiment after three short task 
demonstrations. In effect, they would have been in the laboratory for approximately 5 minutes, 
completed no work, and received $17.50. Instead of doing this, the results showed that people 
actually chose to do the task and in effect, participate in the experiment. Similarly, the participants 
who completed the small Lego task in the second study tended to, albeit not significantly, opt out 
earlier than the people who did not. Therefore, it could be that both groups were participating in the 
experiment for almost the same amount of time. The motivation to do a task and participate in a 
study is a potential sunk cost itself, but it poses a problem for trying to manipulate investment as a 
variable that would elicit the effect as intended. This is further magnified when participants also 
have expectation of the outcomes (Tan & Yates, 1995); something that is likely in many real-life 
behavioural contexts. These findings reveal the need to balance the task type, investment, and 
rewards in a way where confounds such as participant motivation have less of an effect on the 
study. 
The previous research conducted using a conditioning paradigm (Macaskill & Hackenberg, 
2013; Magalhães & White, 2016; Navarro & Fantino, 2005) finds an effect on a basic level of 
behaviour that has a constrained context. Once tasks include contextual information that an 
organism is likely to face, like time, effort and money investments into building something, things 
become unclear (although there is some naturalistic evidence as cited in the previous introductions). 
The studies here tried to account for numerous possible factors that could influence a person’s 
decision in a sunk cost scenario. For example, participants in the first study might have lacked 
motivation to fill up a tube with wooden beads while the second study participants may have been 
too motivated by the Lego construction tasks. Given the possibility of a large reward for completion 
in the first study, these findings present a conundrum of what situations or investments would 
appropriately balance task motivation and reward in a way that lead to a bias such as the sunk cost 
effect.  It seems unlikely that participants in the Cunha Jr and Caldieraro (2009) study or the 
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conditioning paradigm studies were more motivated than participants in Study 1 that had the 
possibility of winning a large amount of money for a shorter period of investment and time. 
However, the previous findings demonstrate that a lack of a large monetary reward or presenting 
people with interesting tasks is not always necessary to reveal an effect.  
That the results showed either no effect or a reverse effect is not isolated within the 
literature. One of the previous discussion points highlighted that the level of knowledge and 
expectation about the outcomes of investment can lessen the impact of sunk costs (Tan & Yates, 
1995), while other studies show a reverse effect under some conditions (Heath, 1995). Furthermore, 
the research showing that the passage of time can lessen the effect of previous investments reveals 
the possibility that the sunk cost effect is limited, even within the group of people that might be 
susceptible to it (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Soman, 2001). Participants in the behavioural studies here 
may have had a mental account for participation and hence, possessed the motivation to do the task 
as described in the previous paragraph. When one also considers the other factors that can affect 
experiments like this, there is the possibility that the sunk cost effect is not as pervasive in a 
behavioural decision-making scenario, as may have been thought based on the research that has 
been conducted on it. 
Finally, the lack of a sunk cost effect here may simply be due to a failure to use appropriate 
tasks and rewards that would otherwise reveal one in the behavioural context. It cannot be ignored 
that there is a behavioural evidence of the effect. Alternatively, the results may reflect a broader 
issue with using novel tasks: that a negative result may reveals issues with the validity of the tasks 
rather than the effect not being present. The tasks here were not used in previous research and 
therefore may not be suitable for finding an effect. As mentioned previously however, there was, 
and still is, not a plethora of behavioural research to build on. Every attempt was made to use 
different types of tasks, rewards, and investments to maximise the opportunity to find a sunk cost 
effect in a short-term behavioural context. Regardless of whether the problem lies with the tasks or 
the context, it is clear that the studies here did not reveal a sunk cost effect for short-term 
behavioural investments. 
4.5. Limitations and future directions 
In the first chapter, I cited numerous studies where the sunk cost effect is apparent when 
people are asked to make decisions based on hypothetical scenarios. As I’ve suggested in the 
previous section, it is possible that the studies described here are missing important components that 
allow a sunk cost effect to emerge and hence, are a small contribution to our knowledge of this area. 
The exploratory nature of the research described here meant that considerations such as the task 
construction and sample size were based primarily on convenience and resource availability. A lack 
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of previously established effect sizes to guide calculating desirable sample sizes rendered it difficult 
to make solid predictions beyond the expectation that an effect could occur in the behavioural 
context of interest. It is notable though that for the most part the revealed effect sizes were 
negligible to small and hence revealing statistically significant results would rely on testing 
impractically large numbers of participants. Further, the trends revealed were largely in the opposite 
direction to that hypothesized. Sample size nonetheless remains a limitation of the research and an 
important issue to consider given the replication crisis previously cited. 
. Nevertheless, if this effect occurs across the domains and situations that the previous 
research suggests, there remains a need to observe the bias when actual investments are at risk. At 
present, there are gaps in our understanding of how the bias operates between the constrained, 
context-free behavioural sunk cost experiments, the anecdotes and naturalistic examples of 
behaviour, and the hypothetical scenarios used in most of the research.  
Another common problem for the studies described here is that the investments and tasks 
may not be sufficiently long enough for participants to feel invested into them. Given that the 
studies here had multiple variations of task, investment, and reward type to help facilitate this, one 
suggestion for future research would be to scale up any behavioural investments involved. For 
example, instead of a single testing session, multiple testing sessions on a desirable task could 
generate enough investment for the participant to consider the time and effort spent in a previous 
session. This could also reduce any multiple independent error factors associated with the initial 
testing session (e.g. tiredness or exhaustion that may have affected participants in the first study of 
Chapter 2). Participants might also be more likely to consider the investment situation if they know 
they will be returning for a follow up session. In addition, the previous issues with rewards (such as 
having a gamble for all or nothing like Study 1) could be solved by having more immediate rewards 
combined with different larger potential rewards at the end of the last session. Systematic changes 
in investment or reward in this manner could help reveal when and how a sunk cost effect occurs 
for short-term investment. The caveat to this modification is that the sessions would have to be 
close enough together to avoid the effect of time on lessening the influence of sunk costs as 
demonstrated in previous research (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Dick & Lord, 1998; Gourville & 
Soman, 1998; Soman, 2001). 
Another important aspect to consider is the possibility that repeated trials on a task is 
important for finding the effect. While one-shot decision situations like the radar-blank plane 
scenario or the pen ratings task used by (Cunha Jr & Caldieraro, 2009) showed an effect, the 
conditioning experiments described previously show that having multiple trials can also reveal an 
effect and works with both human and non-human animals (Avila et al., 2013; Macaskill & 
Hackenberg, 2013). Apart from Study 1, the experiments in this thesis were largely absent of 
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repeated trials or opportunities for investment and reward. To demonstrate the importance of 
repeated trials for actual decision-making, future research could have participants complete 
numerous small tasks like building small Lego sets where feedback and a reward is possible after 
each one. Although the first study in this thesis had participants complete 3 tasks, these were 
potentially too long, unengaging, or physically tiring for participants to feel motivated. A 
combination of more interesting or desirable tasks like Lego building and repeated trials could be 
key to reduce the gap in our knowledge of how important the sunk cost effect is for short-term 
behavioural investments. 
The role of accountability and personal responsibility was another aspect that likely had an 
impact on the failure to find an effect in the studies here. Accountability may lead people to be less 
susceptible to the effect (Simonson & Nye, 1992). While much of the research discussed in the sunk 
cost literature does not have accountability as an explicit feature, it is still a factor that increases the 
likelihood of someone persisting or escalating an investment; with other related factors like 
personal responsibility and overconfidence leading people to be susceptible (Åstebro, Jeffrey, & 
Adomdza, 2007; Garland, 1990; Ronay, Oostrom, Lehmann-Willenbrock, & Van Vugt, 2017; Staw 
& Ross, 1980). This is likely to be true of decisions made as part of a group or company but many 
decisions in a person’s life are not necessarily, or explicitly, accountable to someone else. 
Participants in the second study had personal responsibility over the particular Lego set that was 
chosen, however without accountability, it is difficult to know whether this was important. One way 
to examine the role of scrutiny over the decision-making process in a short-term behavioural setting 
is important would be to have a manipulation where participant’s performance on tasks will be 
“judged” by others. Not only could they choose the task to be completed, but also you could have 
their decision and outcome judged by others in a systematic way. Perhaps participants choose to do 
a task and are then told that other people would have preferred if they had chosen a different task 
(without being able to change their preference). Would they be more likely to try and make the 
investment work with the possibility of facing criticism if it does not work out later? Answering this 
question is important as it might also demonstrate whether there are hidden benefits to the effect. It 
could be advantageous for a person’s reputation if they persist with something despite the 
challenges and costs because it demonstrates to others that the person “doesn’t give up” and “fights 
to the end”. This could explain why a bias such as the sunk cost effect would exist in the first place: 
that there are benefits to a person beyond maximising the investment itself and that the bias is not 
always a bad thing (Sleesman, Conlon, McNamara, & Miles, 2012). Indeed, McAfee, Mialon, and 
Mialon (2010) propose numerous situations such as those just suggested, revealing that the sunk 
cost effect may have hidden benefits. Some argue that by definition, heuristics and biases are 
shortcuts that help navigate complex decision-making situations that organisms may face 
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(Gigerenzer, 2008; Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Simon, 1956). It 
raises the question that of why such biases would be allowed to persist if they are harmful to 
organisms.  
Beyond the importance of finding behavioural evidence for a sunk cost effect, there is a 
broader push for observing whether decision-making heuristics and biases matter for real-world 
outcomes outside the laboratory context (Arkes, 2013; Toplak et al., 2017). As previously indicated 
the majority of the sunk cost effect is both laboratory based and hypothetical (with some naturalistic 
examples). This fact highlights a further need for research on how and when these biases actually 
have an effect in everyday life. The examples are largely still anecdotal, with prominent ones like 
the Concorde Plane showing the effect operating in a large-scale context (Arkes & Ayton, 1999). 
Behavioural research in smaller contexts will get us closer to understanding how and where this 
bias operates.  
Recent research by Toplak, West, and Stanovich, (2017) highlighted that the majority of the 
evidence for decision-making biases come from laboratory studies where important outcomes are 
not actually observed. Indeed, like the sunk cost effect, many reasoning biases necessarily mean 
presenting a decision-making scenario and observing whether a person makes the optimal or correct 
choice. For example, the representative heuristic is a bias in decision-making where people 
incorrectly judge the probability of something according to how similar its features appear to what 
they know of the population that it comes from (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972). Kahneman and 
Tversky (1972) demonstrated this bias with a classic vignette where information about an individual 
known as ‘Tom. W’ is described with a number of attributes that prompt a particular stereotype. 
When asked what field he is likely to be in, people tend to judge that Tom. W is in a field that 
resembles the stereotype; ignoring the base-rate probability that Tom is actually in one of the other 
fields. The issue then is whether being susceptible to biases like these matter for real life outcomes. 
Toplak, West, and Stanovich, (2017) examined a number of biases and whether susceptibility to 
them was related to outcomes such as drinking, substance use, and gambling. The authors found 
that adults who were less susceptible to biases were also less likely to have negative life outcomes 
showing that judgment and decision-making biases may be important for real life. Although 
negative outcomes were measured by self-report, the research by Toplak et al., (2017) gets us closer 
to the goal of finding out whether knowing about heuristics and biases matter. 
As a further step for understanding why the sunk cost effect might occur, we need to find 
more evidence in non-human animals. Although the Arkes and Ayton (1999) paper argued that the 
evidence in other animals was not adequate, a plethora of studies since then, using conditioning 
behaviour experiments, has shown that it is (Magalhães & White, 2016). If this latter research is 
good evidence of the effect in some, distally related animals then it stands to reason that it is likely 
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that this effect occurs in animals that are phylogenetically closer to us such as the great apes. 
Behavioural research, using the conditioning experiments in chimpanzees or other apes could help 
us further understand both why this bias (and the mechanisms behind it) might exist but also how it 
might be distributed across the animal kingdom. To date, no research in our closest living relatives 
has been conducted. 
Our understanding of how the sunk cost effect develops is another area for future research 
that this thesis was unable to examine. Again, what little research exists in young children is largely 
hypothetical and does not provide a clear picture of its development (Baron et al., 1993; Klaczynski 
& Cottrell, 2004; Morsanyi & Handley, 2008, 2013). That older adults may be less susceptible 
(hypothetically) than younger adults suggest that its appearance and one’s susceptibility to it is not 
linear across the lifespan. The research by Morsanyi and Handley (2008) found that heuristic 
responding was linked to children’s cognitive capacity (measured by a short form of a popular 
intelligence test), both increasing with age. As the authors highlight in their paper, the research on 
susceptibility to decision-making biases across early development is as mixed as it is with the 
development of the sunk cost effect. At minimum, a sunk cost effect expressed in the form that is 
similar to the adult research requires an ability to think about or mentally track what has previously 
been invested. Previous investments are often separated temporally and spatially from a person 
when they have to make a decision to act.  In addition to general cognitive capacity, by age 4 to 5 
years children typically develop another capacity that would allow them to reflect and consider 
future possibilities: episodic foresight (Redshaw & Suddendorf, 2013; Suddendorf, Nielsen, & von 
Gehlen, 2011) . For example, four year olds can solve a problem that is both temporally and 
spatially separated from them (Suddendorf et al., 2011), showing evidence of the kind of foresight 
that would be required by a person who is thinking about the different potential consequences of a 
decision. While the memory and foresight of a child would not be the same as an adult (Busby & 
Suddendorf, 2005), this would not be a problem for behavioural tasks and investments that are 
short-term and age appropriate. 
It should be noted however, that if the research using conditioning paradigms in non-human 
animals represent the sunk cost effect, then the cognitive capacities highlighted here would likely 
not be required. The evidence that non-human animals like rats (who have been tested on the sunk 
cost effect) or great apes have these capacities is not strong (Redshaw, 2014). Even without 
capacities such as foresight, the investments in the conditioning experiments only require an 
organism to track what they have previously done in a semantic way (some versus a lot of 
responses) and without spatial separation from the investment or decision. Animals in these 
experiments would also not need to imagine the different future outcomes of their decision like the 
head of a large company investing millions of dollars in a radar-blank plane might or a person 
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weighing up the money they had spent on theatre tickets. If the goal is simply to find behavioural 
evidence at its earliest occurrence in human development then a conditioning paradigm would be 
the ideal form to test this. However, if we want to understand how this bias might operate in 
contexts that humans (and in this case, children) actually experience then we need to develop tasks 
that include different investment types and a relevant context. At present, only parts of these goals 
have been achieved by the existing research.  
One benefit of the suggestions for future research already discussed here is that they could 
be applied to a younger aged sample. Although the tasks used here did not find an effect in adults as 
intended, researchers could adapt the procedure in a way that might show one. Alternatively, one 
could adapt the tasks used by other behavioural researchers (Cunha Jr & Caldieraro, 2009; Navarro 
& Fantino, 2009). If behavioural tasks were initially, or continued to be, successful in adults then 
researchers could test different age groups. This would allow for a direct comparison of the effect of 
sunk costs between the different age groups to examine possible developmental differences and 
provide further behavioural evidence.  
4.6. Conclusions 
The aim of this thesis was to find evidence that adults are susceptible to the sunk cost effect 
using short-term behavioural investments. It was hoped that this examination would lead to tasks 
that could later be adapted for use with young children, as a way of both understanding the 
development of the effect and showing that it occurs in non-hypothetical domains. While there is 
some research using behavioural tasks, the majority involve conditioning paradigms that are context 
free or are difficult to adapt for use with children. A number of studies were conducted to achieve 
these goals. While it is possible that some people behaved according to the sunk cost effect, the 
novel experiments described here failed to find it. A previously used hypothetical scenario was 
successfully replicated here, showing that the sunk cost effect does occur in some domains. 
In conclusion, there are limitations to this research, and I have provided some explanations 
for why an effect may not have been found here. The tasks, rewards, and the motivations of 
participants in behavioural experiments play important role and may explain why an effect may not 
have occurred here. There are still gaps in our knowledge of this bias and how it operates to be 
addressed. More research is needed to ensure we have a thorough understanding of how this effect 
operates in every day decision-making and how it develops over the life span. Along with the 
previous research, there is clearly an effect to be studied and it is evident that it does occur under 
some conditions. However, if we want to be confident that this is something that has a real impact 
on behaviour and every day decision-making (with both small and large-scale consequences) then 
we need to reduce the gap in our knowledge about its occurrence. By improving our understanding 
 68  
of biases such as the sunk cost effect, we can hopefully prevent some of the costly errors in 
decision-making that we make as individuals and as a society. 
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Appendix A – Qualtrics vignettes for Study 3 and 4 
Study 3 
Qualtrics vignettes  
Note: Vignette titles such as ‘Investment High Probability’ were not shown to participants 
Pre-amble 
Imagine you have signed up for a psychology experiment, which takes an hour and will earn you 
$10 for your participation, regardless of the outcome. You arrive to the experiment at the designated 
time and are presented with 3 physical tasks to do. Each task is presented one at a time, with the 
experimenter demonstrating how to do each one. For each task, you have the possibility of attaining 
additional money. 
Investment High Probability 
Imagine that for this task, you must fill up a clear, vertical tube with small wooden beads, one at a 
time, until the tube is completely filled. The beads are placed in a container, approximately 2 metres 
(6.5 feet) from the tube, meaning you must go a short distance each time you take a bead and put it 
in the tube. You are told that at some point, you will be given the opportunity to opt out of the task. 
Your Performance is timed. 
After several minutes of doing the task, the experimenter stops you. You have already filled the 
tube with 75 wooden beads and have 25 wooden beads left to complete the task. You are then given 
the following options: 
1. Opt out of completing the task, receive $2.50 for certain, and move on to the next task. 
 
2. Attempt the task, and if you complete it, a die is rolled. If the die comes up 1 to 3 you get 
nothing; if it comes up 4 to 6 you get $5. You then move on to the next task 
Which option would you choose? 
 
o Option 1 
o Option 2 
Imagine that for this task, you must place small, colored rings on to wooden dowels, one at a time, 
until the dowels are all filled up. The rings are placed in a container, approximately 2 metres (6.5 
feet) from the dowels, meaning you must go a short distance each time you take a ring and place it 
on a dowel. Your performance is timed. 
After several minutes of doing the task, the experimenter stops you. You have already filled the 
dowels with 75 rings and have 25 rings left to complete the task. You are then given the following 
options: 
1. Opt out of completing the task, receive $2.50 for certain, and move on to the next task. 
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2. Attempt the task, and if you complete it, a die is rolled. If the die comes up 1 to 3 you get 
nothing; if it comes up 4 to 6 you get $5. You then move on to the next task 
 
Which option would you choose? 
 
o Option 1 
o Option 2 
 
Imagine that for this task, you must sort color-coded playing cards, on to a black placement area, 
one at a time, until all the cards are sorted by color. The cards are placed in a pile, approximately 2 
metres (6.5 feet) from where they need to be sorted, meaning you must go a short distance each 
time you take a card and sort it by color. Your performance is timed.  
 
After several minutes of doing the task, the experimenter stops you. You have already sorted 75 of 
the cards and have 25 cards left to complete the task. You are then given the following options: 
 
1. Opt out of completing the task, receive $2.50 for certain, and move on to the next task. 
 
2. Attempt the task, and if you complete it, a die is rolled. If the die comes up 1 to 3 you get 
nothing; if it comes up 4 to 6 you get $5. You then move on to the next task 
 
Which option would you choose? 
 
o Option 1 
o Option 2 
 
Investment Low Probability 
Imagine that for this task, you must fill up a clear, vertical tube with small wooden beads, one at a 
time, until the tube is completely filled. The beads are placed in a container, approximately 2 metres 
(6.5 feet) from the tube, meaning you must go a short distance each time you take a bead and put it 
in the tube. You are told that at some point, you will be given the opportunity to opt out of the task. 
Your Performance is timed. 
 
After several minutes of doing the task, the experimenter stops you. You have already filled the 
tube with 75 wooden beads and have 25 wooden beads left to complete the task. You are then given 
the following options: 
 
1. Opt out of completing the task, receive $2.50 for certain, and move on to the next task. 
 
2. Attempt the task, and if you complete it, a die is rolled. If the die comes up 1 to 5 you get 
nothing; if it comes up 6 you get $5. You then move on to the next task 
 
Which option would you choose? 
 
o Option 1 
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o Option 2 
 
Imagine that for this task, you must place small, colored rings on to wooden dowels, one at a time, 
until the dowels are all filled up. The rings are placed in a container, approximately 2 metres (6.5 
feet) from the dowels, meaning you must go a short distance each time you take a ring and place it 
on a dowel. Your performance is timed.    
   
After several minutes of doing the task, the experimenter stops you. You have already filled the 
dowels with 75 rings and have 25 rings left to complete the task. You are then given the following 
options: 
 
1. Opt out of completing the task, receive $2.50 for certain, and move on to the next task. 
 
2. Attempt the task, and if you complete it, a die is rolled. If the die comes up 1 to 5 you get 
nothing; if it comes up 6 you get $5. You then move on to the next task 
 
Which option would you choose? 
 
o Option 1 
o Option 2 
Imagine that for this task, you must sort color-coded playing cards, on to a black placement area, 
one at a time, until all the cards are sorted by color. The cards are placed in a pile, approximately 2 
metres (6.5 feet) from where they need to be sorted, meaning you must go a short distance each 
time you take a card and sort it by color. Your performance is timed.  
After several minutes of doing the task, the experimenter stops you. You have already sorted 75 of 
the cards and have 25 cards left to complete the task. You are then given the following options: 
1. Opt out of completing the task, receive $2.50 for certain, and move on to the next task. 
 
2. Attempt the task, and if you complete it, a die is rolled. If the die comes up 1 to 5 you get 
nothing; if it comes up 6 you get $5. You then move on to the next task 
 
Which option would you choose? 
 
o Option 1 
o Option 2 
No Investment High Probability 
Imagine that for this task, you must fill up a clear, vertical tube with small wooden beads, one at a 
time, until 25 wooden beads have been put into the tube. The beads are placed in a container, 
approximately 2 metres (6.5 feet) from the tube, meaning you must go a short distance each time 
you take a bead and put it in the tube. Your performance is timed. 
Before you begin the task you are given the following options: 
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1. Opt out of completing the task, receive $2.50 for certain, and move on to the next task. 
 
2. Attempt the task, and if you complete it, a die is rolled. If the die comes up 1 to 3 you get 
nothing; if it comes up 4 to 6 you get $5. You then move on to the next task 
 
Which option would you choose? 
 
o Option 1 
o Option 2 
Imagine that for this task, you must place small, colored rings on to wooden dowels, one at a time, 
until 25 of the rings have been placed. The rings are placed in a container, approximately 2 
metres (6.5 feet) from the dowels, meaning you must go a short distance each time you take a ring 
and place it on a dowel. Your performance is timed. 
Before you begin the task you are given the following options: 
1. Opt out of completing the task, receive $2.50 for certain, and move on to the next task. 
 
2. Attempt the task, and if you complete it, a die is rolled. If the die comes up 1 to 3 you get 
nothing; if it comes up 4 to 6 you get $5. You then move on to the next task 
 
Which option would you choose? 
 
o Option 1 
o Option 2 
Imagine that for this task, you must sort color-coded playing cards, on to a black placement area, 
one at a time, until 25 cards have been sorted by color. The cards are placed in a pile, approximately 
2 metres (6.5 feet) from where they need to be sorted, meaning you must go a short distance each 
time you take a card and sort it by color. Your performance is timed.    
Before you begin the task you are given the following options: 
1. Opt out of completing the task, receive $2.50 for certain, and move on to the next task. 
 
2. Attempt the task, and if you complete it, a die is rolled. If the die comes up 1 to 3 you get 
nothing; if it comes up 4 to 6 you get $5. You then move on to the next task 
 
 
Which option would you choose? 
 
o Option 1 
o Option 2 
No Investment Low Probability 
Imagine that for this task, you must fill up a clear, vertical tube with small wooden beads, one at a 
time, until 25 wooden beads have been put into the tube. The beads are placed in a container, 
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approximately 2 metres (6.5 feet) from the tube, meaning you must go a short distance each time 
you take a bead and put it in the tube. Your performance is timed. 
Before you begin the task you are given the following options: 
1. Opt out of completing the task, receive $2.50 for certain, and move on to the next task. 
 
2. Attempt the task, and if you complete it, a die is rolled. If the die comes up 1 to 5 you get 
nothing; if it comes up 6 you get $5. You then move on to the next task 
 
Which option would you choose? 
 
o Option 1 
o Option 2 
Imagine that for this task, you must place small, colored rings on to wooden dowels, one at a time, 
until 25 of the rings have been placed. The rings are placed in a container, approximately 2 
metres (6.5 feet) from the dowels, meaning you must go a short distance each time you take a ring 
and place it on a dowel. Your performance is timed. 
Before you begin the task you are given the following options: 
1. Opt out of completing the task, receive $2.50 for certain, and move on to the next task. 
 
2. Attempt the task, and if you complete it, a die is rolled. If the die comes up 1 to 5 you get 
nothing; if it comes up 6 you get $5. You then move on to the next task 
 
Which option would you choose? 
 
o Option 1 
o Option 2 
Imagine that for this task, you must sort color-coded playing cards, on to a black placement area, 
one at a time, until 25 cards have been sorted by color. The cards are placed in a pile, approximately 
2 metres (6.5 feet) from where they need to be sorted, meaning you must go a short distance each 
time you take a card and sort it by color. Your performance is timed.    
Before you begin the task you are given the following options: 
1. Opt out of completing the task, receive $2.50 for certain, and move on to the next task. 
 
2. Attempt the task, and if you complete it, a die is rolled. If the die comes up 1 to 5 you get 
nothing; if it comes up 6 you get $5. You then move on to the next task 
 
Which option would you choose? 
 
o Option 1 
o Option 2 
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Study 4 
Qualtrics vignettes (Arkes and Blumer, 1985) 
Sunk Cost 
As the president of an airline company, you have invested 10 million dollars of the company's 
money into a research project. The purpose was to build a plane that would not be detected by 
conventional radar, in other words, a radar-blank plane. When the project is 90% completed, 
another firm begins to marketing a plane that cannot be detected by radar. Also, it is apparent that 
their plane is much faster and far more economical than the plane your company is building. The 
question is: should you invest the last 10% of the research funds to finish your radar-blank plane? 
o Yes 
o No 
No Sunk Cost 
As president of an airline company, you have received a suggestion from one of your employees. 
The suggestion is to use the last 1 million dollars of your research funds to develop a plane that 
would not be detected by conventional radar, in other words, a radar blank plane. However, another 
firm has just begun marketing a plane that cannot be detected by radar. Also, it is apparent that their 
plane is much faster and far more economical than the plane your company is building. The 
question is: should you invest the last million dollars of your research funds to build the radar-blank 
plane proposed by your employee? 
o Yes 
o No 
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Appendix B – Risk tolerance quiz with scoring scheme 
The Risk tolerance quiz (Grable & Lytton, 1999) was used as is, but delivered via the Qualtrics 
platform. The original can be found at https://njaes.rutgers.edu/money/riskquiz/investmet-risk-
tolerance-quiz-scoring-grid-Grable-and-Lytton.pdf. 
 
Qualtrics Preamble 
On the next page you will be asked a number of questions regarding investing your money, time, 
and effort. 
Choose the response that best describes you – there are no “right” or “wrong” answers. 
These questions should take less than 5 minutes 
Questions 
Q1 In general, how would your best friend describe you as a risk taker? 
o A real gambler 
o Willing to take risks after completing adequate research 
o Cautious 
o A real risk avoider 
Q2 You are on a TV game show and can choose one of the following. Which would you take? 
o $1,000 in cash 
o A 50% chance at winning $5,000 
o A 25% chance at winning $10,000 
o A 5% chance at winning $100,000 
Q3 You have just finished saving for a “once-in-a-lifetime” vacation. Three weeks before you plan 
to leave, you lose your job. You would: 
o Cancel the vacation 
o Take a much more modest vacation 
o Go as scheduled, reasoning that you need the time to prepare for a job search 
o Extend your vacation, because this might be your last chance to go first-class 
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Q4 If you unexpectedly received $20,000 to invest, what would you do? 
o Deposit it in a bank account, money market account, or an insured CD 
o Invest it in safe high quality bonds or bond mutual funds 
o Invest it in stocks or stock mutual funds 
Q5 If you unexpectedly received $20,000 to invest, how comfortable would you be to Invest it in 
stocks or stock mutual funds? 
o Not at all comfortable 
o Somewhat comfortable 
o Very comfortable 
Q6 When you think of the word “risk” which of the following words comes to mind first? 
o Not at all comfortable 
o Somewhat comfortable 
o Very comfortable 
Q7 Some experts are predicting prices of assets such as gold, jewels, collectibles, and real estate 
(hard assets) to increase in value; bond prices may fall, however, experts tend to agree that 
government bonds are relatively safe. Most of your investment assets are now in high interest 
government bonds. What would you do? 
o Hold the bonds 
o Sell the bonds, put half the proceeds into money market accounts, and the other half into 
hard assets 
o Sell the bonds and put the total proceeds into hard assets 
o Sell the bonds, put all the money into hard assets, and borrow additional money to buy more 
Q8 Given the best and worst case returns of the four investment choices below, which would you 
prefer? 
o $200 gain best case; $0 gain/loss worst case 
o $800 gain best case; $200 loss worst case 
o $2,600 gain best case; $800 worst case 
o $4,800 gain best case; $2,800 loss worst case 
Q9 In addition to whatever you own, you have been given $1,000. You are now asked to choose 
between: 
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o A sure gain of $500 
o A 50% chance to gain $1,000 and a 50% chance to gain nothing 
Q10 In addition to whatever you own, you have been given $2,000. You are now asked to choose 
between: 
o A sure loss of $500 
o A 50% chance to lose $1,000 and a 50% chance to lose nothing 
Q11 Suppose a relative left you an inheritance of $100,000 stipulating in the will that you invest 
ALL the money in ONE of the following choices. Which one would you select? 
o A savings account or money market mutual fund 
o A mutual fund that owns stocks and bonds 
o A portfolio of 15 common stocks 
o Commodities like gold, silver, and oil 
Q12 If you had to invest $20,000, which of the following investment choices would you find most 
appealing? 
o 60% in low-risk investments 30% in medium-risk investments 10% in high-risk investments 
o 30% in low-risk investments 40% in medium-risk investments 30% in high-risk investments 
o 10% in low-risk investments 40% in medium-risk investments 50% in high-risk investments 
Q13 Your trusted friend and neighbor, an experienced geologist, is putting together a group of 
investors to fund an exploratory gold mining venture. The venture could pay back 50 to 100 
times the investment if successful. If the mine is a bust, the entire investment is worthless. Your 
friend estimates the chance of success is only 20%. If you had the money, how much would 
you invest? 
o Nothing 
o One month’s salary 
o Three month’s salary 
o Six month’s salary 
Scoring 
The scoring for the Risk Tolerance Survey was the same as the original. For questions 2 to 13, the 
scoring was as follows: 
• A score of 1 was given if participants answered the first option. 
 89  
• A score of 2 was given if the second option was selected 
• A score of 3 was given if the third option was selected 
• A score of 4 was given if the fourth option was selected 
• If a question only had two options, a score of 1 was given for the first option and a 3 was 
given for the second option 
Question 1 was reversed, such that selecting the first option meant a score of 4 was given; a 3 was 
given for the second; a 2 was given for the third; and a 1 was given for the fourth. 
Scores were totalled for each participant by adding up their responses to the thirteen questions. 
According to Grable and Lytton (1999), a score of 18 or below indicated Low risk tolerance while 
33 and above indicated High risk tolerance; with scores between 18 and 33 having their own level 
of risk tolerance (e.g. participants scoring between 23 and 28 are considered to have 
average/moderate risk tolerance). Due to the non-significant results found in the Chapter 3 study, 
participants’ risk tolerance categories are not discussed. 
 
